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Abstract
Challenged by nominal revenue growth rates in their developed home markets, many
MNCs are enticed to drive revenue growth through geographic expansion. Thus, for many firms,
launching into emerging markets has become a key growth priority. Because international
expansion and the marketing strategy guiding it is always challenging, organizational learning is
key. However, researchers have yet to closely examine the relationship between organizational
learning and marketing strategy. This research seeks to address that gap. When firms enter new
markets, the marketing mix framework represents a subset of decisions they must make. This
study analyzes an MNC’s 4Ps (product, price, place, and promotion) through the lens of
emergent strategy, exploring how an MNC’s marketing launch strategy in China emerges over
time through knowledge acquisition. Using the case study method, this research examines how
four types of knowledge acquisition—congenital, vicarious, experiential, grafting, and sensing
and noticing—influence the firm’s marketing mix to emerge and change over time. A conceptual
framework illustrates how each element of the marketing mix is realized or emerges through the
four knowledge acquisition activities.

Keywords: Marketing Mix, Emergent Strategy, Knowledge Acquisition, Organizational
Learning, Case Study, China, Emerging Market, Marketing Strategy

1

1.0 INTRODUCTION
It is no surprise that emerging markets offer a substantial growth opportunity for
multinational companies (MNCs). As the PwC report, The World in 2050, projects, the world
economy could more than double in size by 2050, with emerging markets growing twice as fast
as advanced economies and potentially increasing their share of GDP from 35% to nearly 50%
(PWC, 2017). These emerging economies offer a clear opportunity for MNCs. Given this
opportunity, coupled with nominal growth rates in their developed home markets, many MNCs
are seeking to drive revenue growth through geographic expansion. Indeed, launching into
emerging markets has become a key growth priority—one that is intensified by factors such as
market attractiveness and market size.
What is surprising is that MNCs often use market size alone as the sole determinant for
launching into a new region, placing far less significance on the challenges entailed by
foreignness and cultural distance (Yeniyurt, Townsend, & Talay, 2007). Enamored sheerly by
population size, these firms often wrongly assume that success is certain through obtaining
nominal market share. Yet countless examples exist of brand and product launch failures into
emerging markets. Top management teams (TMTs) often establish a local sales force despite
knowing little about the cultural differences and market contexts affecting the habits and usages
of local choosers and users (ch/users). However, as firms look to expand beyond their home
markets, understanding these issues becomes not only important, but also essential to their
success.
Because economies are rapidly evolving, companies must have dynamic and flexible
operating strategies if they are to succeed when launching into new markets (PWC, 2017).
Although practitioners typically invest significant resources into creating marketing strategies to
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launch in emerging markets, and researchers have analyzed the internationalization process of
firms, the literature has yet to thoroughly examine how marketing strategies emerge over time as
firms enter new markets. An effective market strategy requires a myriad of inputs, activities and
insights from multiple actors. When launching into new markets, an organization must
continually acquire knowledge and use this learning to shape and reframe the elements of its
marketing mix. By examining the marketing mix framework through the lenses of both
emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1979a, 1988) and organizational learning’s (OL’s) knowledge
acquisition concept (Huber, 1991), this study explores how an MNC in the consumer products
industry constructs and emerges its marketing strategy. This study seeks to advance knowledge
by examining how scholars and marketers might employ these theories to develop marketing
strategies for emerging markets.
Specifically, the study examines the MNC’s trials, tribulations, triumphs, and failures
with an eye on the extent and impact of OL that ensues during this process, as well as how the
marketing mix emerges over time. The research design, guided by Mathiassen et al., (2012)
defines the study’s composition. Figure 1 shows Mathiassen et al.’s (2012) framework along
with related study data.
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Table 1. Research Composition (Mathiasson et al., 2012)
Component

Definition

Dissertation Approach
MNCs are looking to deliver growth through
geographic expansion. Launching
unfamiliar brands and product innovations in
emerging markets is complex; TMTs
therefore look for best practices to help them
develop a market entry strategy with the
highest likelihood of success.

P

The problem setting
represents people’s
concerns in a real-world
problematic situation

A

The area of concern
represents some body of
knowledge within the
literature that relates to P

F

The conceptual framing
helps structure collection
and analyses of data from P
to answer the research

question (RQ); FA draws on 
concepts from A, whereas FI
draws on concepts
independent of A

M

The adopted methods of
empirical inquiry

RQ

The research question
relates to P, opens for
research into A, and helps
ensure that the research
design is coherent and
consistent

C

The contribution of the
inquiry

Launching in emerging markets and the
marketing strategy; marketing mix

Emergent Strategy Theory (Mintzberg)
Organizational Learning Theory—
Knowledge Acquisition Concept (Huber)

A longitudinal, qualitative case study of an
MNCs entry into the China market
RQ: How does a marketing launch strategy
into China emerge over time via knowledge
acquisition?

Cp: Learnings that help marketers optimize
a marketing strategy via knowledge
acquisition activities prior to launching into
emerging markets.
Ca: Historical account of how a marketing
strategy emerges through the OL lens
Cf: Explore the role of knowledge
acquisition (an OL sub-process) in the
strategy process
4

This study looks to fill a gap in literature on how OL’s knowledge acquisition activities
specifically impact the marketing mix of an MNC launching into China. To do this, it uses the
lens of emergent strategy theory and offers the following expected contributions to knowledge
and practice: 1) It will examine if and how marketing mix emerges over time and influences the
success of a global consumer products manufacturer’s efforts to launch into a foreign market. 2)
It will explore the strategic role of distinct types of OL knowledge acquisition — congenital,
vicarious, experiential, grafting, and searching. 3) It will provide a real-life, longitudinal casebased examination of an MNC launching into the Chinese market.
To begin, the study examines challenges that organizations face when launching into
emerging markets. It then provides an overview of the setting in which the MNC chooses to
launch a brand into China. Next, it offers a framework for evaluating the MNC’s marketing mix,
using the lens of OL and emergent strategy theory, then provides an overview of its research
methodology and data collection. Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of findings,
followed by its contributions and limitations.
1.1 Problem Setting
The study’s setting is the consumer products industry. This is timely given MNCs
continued and vigorous efforts to launch consumer products and brands in emerging markets
across the globe. Launching new products into China is a particular lure for MNCs looking to
attain growth beyond their home markets. With more than 1.4 billion people and a GDP growth
rate of 6.5% (World Bank, 2016), China is a dream market for consumer product companies
around the world. Not only is it on course to be the world’s largest economy—forecasted to
account for up to 20% of global GDP by 2050 (PWC, 2017)—but also, the Chinese middle class
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continues to grow. Indeed, McKinsey & Company forecast that 76% of China’s urban population
will be considered middle class by 2022 (Dominic Barton, 2013). Given this growth of the
middle class and their enormous spending power, private consumption of goods and services is
expected to rise in China. The world’s largest population coupled with sizeable middle-class
growth is clearly inspiring ever more growth-seeking MNCs, who often rush to launch into this
relatively untapped market. Yet to date, the business performance of MNCs in China has been
mixed.
1.2 Launching into the Chinese Market
A common error committed by firms launching into China is duplicating the home market
strategy with no local adaptation whatsoever. What works in the West, however, cannot be
applied directly to Chinese launches. In fact, such an approach can be a recipe for disaster; when
marketers fail to understand the Chinese consumer’s motivations, their products “will die a quick
and painful death.” (Doctoroff, 2005). Such a death has befallen many MNC launches in
China—too many to list here. Whether due to brand names being inappropriately translated,
products launching with little understanding of differing usage and habits of Chinese consumers,
or simply an over simplification of cultural barriers that must be overcome, launching brands
into China is not easy and market size alone is hardly a guarantee of success. Several companies
have recently announced missteps in their China entry strategies. Netflix and Uber admitted they
are re-evaluating their current marketing strategies due to disappointing sales results. Even firms
such as YUM, which previously benefited from long-term growth in China, is preparing to spin
off its local KFC and Pizza Hut businesses based on currency devaluation and food-safety
scandals. Caterpillar experienced early success in the Chinese market, but is now facing the
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stark reality of 24 straight quarters of declining sales due to slowed infrastructure growth
(Linnane, 2016).
Despite the challenges, China cannot be ignored by firms with global aspirations; as
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg put it, “You can’t have a mission to want to connect everyone in
the world and leave out the biggest country.” (Linnane, 2016). Yet companies cannot expect to be
successful by blindly and homogeneously applying a North American or Western strategy to the
Chinese market. “The only way to escape the ruthless jaws of the market is to grasp [that] the
difference between products and brands must be rooted in and built on fundamental insights.”
(Doctoroff, 2005). To develop effective marketing strategies, companies must stimulate both
formal and informal learning activities. “Insights hit the sweet spot of desire.” (Doctoroff,
2005). MNCs with successful brands in China evolved their marketing strategy over time.
Starbucks attributes its success in China due its long-term commitment and to adapting strategies
and product offerings to local markets (Wang, 2012). Successful organizations continually work
to garner insights about the Chinese market and consumer, engaging in deep analysis and
planning.
1.3 Introduction: Newell Brands and Its Rubbermaid Commercial Products Division
Newell Brands (NB) is a $15B Fortune 500 consumer goods company organized around
16 operating divisions. NB’s strategy, the Growth Game Plan (GGP), establishes a set of
investment priorities for more than 50 of its major brands and places a high priority on
geographic expansion. Currently, 70% of NB revenue is realized in North America. Given this,
growth driven by geographic expansion—specifically into emerging markets such as China,
India, and Mexico—is considered a strategic imperative to the firm’s long-term success and
growth ambitions. Within the GGP, Rubbermaid Commercial Products (RCP), a brand with a
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broad product portfolio, was deemed ripe for market expansion, specifically into China. RCP is
both a consumer and commercial brand; it has high brand awareness and strong equity in North
America among ch/users. RCP plays in four key product categories: 1) refuse and recycling, 2)
cleaning solutions, 3) mobility, and 4) food service. Products in these categories are
manufactured in the US and marketed to users and choosers across nine distinct verticals (see
Figure 1). RCP’s North America positioning is tightly tied to its leadership in innovation and
product benefits. “Only RCP products outperform and outlast anyone else” (#1) 1 is the brand’s
core proposition; the foundation of its North American success is built on durability, quality, and
innovation. For example, the Brute® trashcan launched in 1973 and has become an icon of RCP
in North America. Brute was a groundbreaking trash receptacle constructed from durable
polycarbonate materials guaranteed not to chip, crack, crush, or rust—qualities quite novel in
comparison to its metal receptacle competitors. This product is one of many innovations
responsible for RCP’s heritage and reputation. Considering its North American success, RCP has
an eye toward global aspirations. The growing middle class in China, along with the growth in
its hospitality, property management, and food service verticals made it particularly appealing.
In previous efforts, the brand had made little headway in entering countries such as China and
Brazil. Still, given its forecasted growth potential (Figure 2), China continued to be a priority.

1

The number following the quotations refers to source document from NB as set forth in the Appendices
section 7.0 where each has an identifying number in the last column.
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Figure 1. Rubbermaid Commercial Products—vertical priorities. (#4)
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Figure 2. China’s GDP growth. (#4)
2.0 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK
2.1 Defining the Marketing Mix
Understanding how MNCs enter international markets and the factors that predict their
performance continues to be a key topic among scholars and practitioners alike. To be
successful, organizations must have a clear understanding of consumer needs and ensure that
they possess a compelling and relevant offering to meet those needs in the marketplace. The
market orientation approach has become a prominent fixture in firms, and it is widely viewed as
critical to performance (Moorman, 1999). In essence, a market orientation philosophy focuses on
discovering and meeting the needs of consumers. Because this approach holds true whether the
market is domestic or foreign, the marketing context is used here to ground the study. The
marketing mix (McCarthy, 1981) is a simple, widely accepted framework that practitioners rely
10

on when dealing with marketing issues. Its key elements are known as the 4Ps: product, place,
price, and promotion (see Figure 3). These four elements help guide the marketing manager in
successfully developing a strategy to target the desired customer.
Some forums, however, debate the 4Ps’ ability to meet 21st century marketing challenges
(Ettenson, Conrado, & Knowles, 2013). One such challenge is that the marketing mix
framework results in the development of narrowly focused product strategies rather than
solutions for consumers. Innovation and product quality have been identified as important
contributors to brand value in industrial markets, yet some researchers deem the product itself to
be the least important factor in the marketing mix as it relates to consumer marketing (Beverland,
Napoli, & Lindgreen, 2007). Perreult et al. (2014) address this challenge, stressing the
importance of defining the target customer and reiterating that, in the marketing process, it is
critical to understand the target consumers and their unmet needs prior to developing a 4Ps
marketing mix. Doing so will ensure that marketers develop the right solutions and/or products
to meet consumer needs. Despite opposition to the marketing mix framework, it remains a
prominent feature in both business schools and marketing practice due to its simplicity,
applicability, and richness (Constantinides, 2006). This study uses the marketing mix framework
because it aligns with the idea that marketing functions facilitate the link between consumer
understanding and key processes within the firm (Day, 1990). This framework, combined with
the OL theoretical context and emergent strategy theory, provide a rich view into an
organization’s entry into emerging markets.
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Figure 3. Marketing mix—strategy decision areas organized by the four Ps. (Perreault et al.,
2014)
2.2 Emergent Strategy
The marketing mix framework represents a subset of four decisions firms must make
when entering new markets. This research therefore analyzes NB’s 4Ps through the lens of
corporate strategy. Researchers have undertaken significant analysis of strategy creation within
organizations (Andrews (1980); Porter (1980); Steiner (1979). These traditional views define
strategy as a deliberate, premeditated activity focused on a firm’s intentions and equate strategy
making with planning, positing that strategies are “formulated” before they are “implemented.”
Mintzberg deems this strategy-making approach to be both restrictive and inconsistent with the
current dilemmas organizations face (1979b, 1988; 1985). He argues that viewing strategy only
through the lens of intentions creates a gap in the understanding of a firm’s behaviors and

12

actions. That gap results from strategy being viewed solely through the perspective of those who
intended the strategy, rather than examining how that strategy played out over time.
Organizations operate in dynamic and complex environments, yet the conventional view
of strategy fails to identify how firms institute strategy changes in the face of environmental,
leadership, or organizational forces. Recent studies offer a novel approach to account for these
strategic shifts. Mintzberg (1988) suggests that strategies are not only planned, but also
subsequently enacted and pursued. After tracking numerous organizations over time and
analyzing their actions and behaviors, Mintzberg determined that firms form strategies in a
variety of ways. He contends that strategy can be both deliberate and emerging, and can be
represented as the end points of a continuum (see Figure 4 below). These two facets of strategy
can help researchers and practitioners better analyze a firm’s behaviors and decisions. Mintzberg
defines deliberate strategies as those planned prior to implementation, and emergent strategies
as patterns that exist and are realized despite (or in absence of) intent. He suggests that the
interplay between these deliberate and emergent strategies is what ultimately defines strategy
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
The concept of emergent strategy suggests a lack of neither planning nor understanding;
it is rather an example of firms responding to their industries and being sensitive to their
experiences. In some situations, it is impossible for a strategist or organization to foresee the
potential outcomes or factors that will affect a formed strategy. Thus, rather than viewing
strategy as solely a planning activity, Mintzberg suggests that action drives thinking rather than
planning. To highlight this, he uses the analogy of the potter’s wheel (1988): Potters roll clay in
their studios to create a sculpture, continuing to think and react to stimulus in their environment,
which might ultimately result in a structure different from the one they originally intended. That
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is, through formulation and implementation, a fluid process of learning takes place and the
sculpture evolves. Similarly, as organizations learn and try new things, they eventually find
success, and this outcome changes their strategic course (Mintzberg, 1988).
This study uses Mintzberg’ s definition of strategy as “a pattern in a stream of decisions,
actions, and behaviors” (1979b). It identifies and observes the actions and experiences of the
RCP marketing strategy over time. Emergent strategy suggests that, through implementation,
organizations learn what works or fails through practice. Learning is therefore a key foundation
of the emergent strategy framework. Against this backdrop, this study seeks to advance
knowledge by identifying how knowledge acquisition—an OL subconstruct—affects a firm’s
marketing mix (action) and therefore how its strategy emerges over time.

Figure 4. Types of strategies. (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985)
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2.3 Organizational Learning and Knowledge Acquisition
To examine how the marketing mix emerges for an MNC entering a foreign market, this
study applies the OL framework’s knowledge acquisition concept (Huber, 1991).
2.3.1 Organizational learning theory. OL theory is increasingly accepted within
international business literature as a mechanism for differentiating firm performance. OL’s
impact—and specifically the impact of experiential learning—is presumed to be even more
critical and complex in the context of international expansion and success (Casillas & MorenoMenedez, 2014). By engaging in international business activities, firms acquire knowledge
about foreign markets and operations. This, in turn, enables them to overcome the challenges of
context—namely, unfamiliarity with foreign markets and the potential liability of foreignness. In
this foreign-market context, OL embraces all of the types of knowledge the firm accumulates,
including its ability to find, analyze, and act on international issues (De Clercq, Sapienza, &
Crijns, 2003). The learning firm continuously strives to understand international markets to
achieve a competitive advantage in the global marketplace and, in turn, to improve its
performance. As defined by Levitt and March (1988), OL enables organizations to encode
“inferences from history into routines that guide behavior.” More specifically, Huber (1991)
notes that an organization learns if any of its units acquire knowledge that it recognizes as
potentially useful.
Given a firm’s unfamiliarity with the foreign market, cultures, and environments,
international expansion and the strategy guiding it are always challenging. OL is therefore key.
OL’s importance also stems from the fact that firms are knowledge-creating entities (Levitt &
March., 1988) that acquire, assimilate, and exploit knowledge to achieve commercial ends.
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Therefore, knowledge about foreign markets and a firm’s capability to create and use it are
among the most important sources of that firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. Figure 5
shows the constructs of OL theory articulated by Huber (1991). As the figure shows, OL has
many subconstructs; for parsimony, this study focuses specifically on knowledge acquisition.

Figure 5. Constructs and processes associated with organizational learning (blue outline
highlights this study’s focus). (Huber, 1991)

2.3.2 Knowledge acquisition. The literature defines knowledge based on how a firm
acquires it, dividing it into the constructs of objective and experiential knowledge (Penrose,
1966). When firms enter new markets, they acquire objective knowledge through standardized
methods of collecting and transmitting information (such as market research), which can be
easily transferred to other countries and replicated by other firms.
Experiential knowledge can be learned only by experience and is not easily transferable.
International marketing literature posits that experiential knowledge of the market and
16

consumers, as well as problems and opportunities abroad, are acquired only by operating in the
international market. The literature postulates that domestic firms’ experiential knowledge
initially reflects their operations in their home market only. As the term suggests, experiential
knowledge requires experience to acquire; some researchers consider it to be more important
than objective knowledge in informing a firm’s decision making in the international business
context (Casillas & Moreno-Menedez, 2014). Internationalization theories posit that experience
gained from a foreign marketplace can translate into knowledge that firms can use to resolve
problems within and select alternative options for its international operations. In other words,
multinational firms learn when they interact with foreign markets, respond to changes within
them, detect problems, and act to correct them.
This study seeks to go beyond the concepts of experiential versus objective knowledge to
explain how knowledge is acquired and understand a firm’s performance in international
markets. To do this, it looks to Huber’s (1991) knowledge acquisition construct to succinctly
define how firms acquire knowledge and provide a rich understanding of firm behavior, focusing
on a particular firm’s marketing mix. The study framework not only examines how the firm’s
marketing mix elements emerged, but also why the firm decided to alter its strategy. Huber’s
approach to the OL knowledge acquisition framework provides five knowledge acquisition
concepts: congenital, vicarious, grafted, experiential, and searching. These concepts, which the
researcher identified in the data and observed in practice, were helpful in defining the firm’s
behaviors related to its emergent strategy as it launched in China. Table 2 shows the knowledge
acquisition definitions.
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Table 2. Definitions of Knowledge Acquisition (Huber, 1991)
Subconstruct of Knowledge
Acquisition
Congenital
Vicarious
Grafted
Experiential
Searching/Noticing

Definition
Knowledge the firm begins with; current
processes and understandings; current markets
Knowledge acquired by imitating and/or
observing other firms
Knowledge acquired by bringing new people
into the organization and gleaning from their
experiences and knowledge
Learning through direct experience; intentional
but often unintentional
1) Scanning for learning 2) Focused search
(purposeful around a specific area); proactive
versus reactive 3) Performance monitoring

2.4. Engaged Scholarship
When this study began, the researcher was Senior Vice President of Marketing for RCP,
and found the idea of combining academia with practice—specifically, with developing a
marketing strategy to launch RCP into a China – an invigorating and extremely valuable study
for two key reasons. First, it offered a clear opportunity to learn from academic research and its
implications for launching into new markets. Theory can help practitioners understand what is
happening in practice and provide a potentially repeatable framework that they can use to
address the complex problems that arise while developing a marketing mix for an emerging
market. Second, the researcher views the business world as an exciting ground for research, as
its real-world context provides the chance to tease out theories and test findings.
The researcher approached this study using the lens of engaged scholarship, defined by
Van De Ven as a form of research bringing together academia and practice (Van De Ven, 2007).
As NB’s SVP of Marketing for RCP and an engaged scholar, the researcher chose a longitudinal
case study method as the best approach to explore the research question. The key areas for
18

consideration were 1) access to multiple data sources offering rich insights into NB’s learning,
knowledge acquisition activity, and marketing mix; and 2) the researcher’s ability to utilize both
archival data and real-time observation based on her role within NB (Van De Ven, 2007). Using
theory-driven data analysis, the study explores the type of question case studies look to answer:
how and why questions (Yin, 1994). That is, this research seeks to understand how NB’s
marketing launch strategy into China emerges over time via knowledge acquisition.
Understanding how knowledge acquisition influences the elements of the marketing mix can
promote deeper understanding of issues related to entering new markets for both scholars and
practitioners.
2.5 Scope and Limitations
A known constraint of this study is that all data is archival and/or secondary, so the
researcher was unable to administer additional surveys or interviews when certain questions or
themes emerged that required additional information to draw conclusions.
2.6 Summary
By incorporating the knowledge acquisition concept into the emergent strategy theory,
this study examines how distinct aspects of knowledge acquisition inform the marketing mix of
an MNC entering a new market—specifically, NB launching its RCP brand into China. This
approach can improve understanding of how marketing strategies emerge over time and how
companies perform within them. The study will explore how strategies were realized or emerged
based on NB’s application of and response to learnings, additional information, and changing
outcomes. That is, it will explore how knowledge acquisition shaped NB’s marketing strategy.
Finally, this study will help researchers comprehend the intricacies of a North American brand’s
strategy development while launching in China, as well as give marketers a framework for
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evaluating and approaching their own market entry strategies. Table 3 summarizes the concepts
and constructs used for this study.
Table 3. Key Constructs of This Study
Themes

Concepts
Product

Place
Marketing Mix
(Perreault et al., 2014)
Promotion

Price

Congenital Learning
Vicarious Learning
Knowledge Acquisition
(OL sub-process)
(Huber, 1991)

Grafting
Experiential
Searching/Scanning

Strategy
(Mintzberg & Waters,
1985)

Deliberate
Emergent

Definitions
Decisions made in developing a physical
good, service, or blend of both to satisfy a
need in the target market
Decisions involved in getting the right
product to the target market's place,
ensuring it is available where and when
consumers want it
Decisions made in telling the target market
about the right product, focusing on
acquiring new customers or retaining
current customers
Decisions made in setting price by
estimating expected customer reaction to
the total offering and the costs of getting it
to them
Knowledge the firm begins with; current
processes and understanding of the firm and
current markets
Knowledge acquired by imitating and/or
observing other firms
Knowledge acquired by bringing new
people into the organization and gleaning
from their experiences and knowledge
Learning through direct experience,
intentionally or unintentionally
1) Scanning for learning 2) Focused search
(purposeful around a specific area);
proactive versus reactive 3) Performance
monitoring
Strategy is formulated/planned and then
implemented
Strategies appear without clear intentions or
in spite of them
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Figure 6. Proposed framework for this study.

3.0 METHODOLOGY: LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY DESIGN
3.1 Site Selection and Newell Brands Description
NB is a $15B Fortune 500 company; it operates 16 global business segments and aspires
to grow in emerging markets. NB’s portfolio includes both consumer and industrial brands, as
well as RCP, a prominent brand that represents both B2B and B2C business models. The RCP
division sells in key retailers such as DIY (Lowes, Home Depot) and Club channels, yet the
brand growth potential lies heavily on the B2B side. Developing refuse offerings and cleaning
solutions for distributors, property owners, and/or building service contractors (BSCs) is key to
the brand’s long-term success. The marketing mix’s B2B aspect has an additional level of
complexity compared to consumer brands because the offering must meet the needs of both users
(cleaning professionals) and choosers (procurement teams, property owners, etc.).
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NB’s stated corporate strategy placed a high priority on driving growth through
expanding in Asian and Latin American markets. As the SVP of Marketing for RCP, the study
researcher was responsible for developing a marketing strategy for the brand in China. RCP’s
positioning in North America is tightly tied to its leadership in innovation and product benefits.
The RCP brand is known for durability, quality, and innovation in the core categories of cleaning
and refuse. Based on available data, the study sought to analyze the compatibility of the
marketing mix with ch/users in these industries.
Because RCP’s market development strategy is in its preliminary stages and currently
has low brand awareness in China, it is an opportune time to evaluate its marketing mix 4Ps and
compatibility with Chinese ch/users. Rather than perform a post analysis on why a marketing
mix was successful or not, the researcher was able to look both retrospectively and forward to
evaluate RCP China marketing mix by analyzing it and how each element of the 4Ps emerges
and/or is realized through knowledge acquisition. RCP is a prime candidate for examination as
NB looks to conceive and implement its strategy in a worldwide setting (Aaker &
Joachimsthaler, 1999).
3.2 Data Collection
Archival data informs this study, both primary and secondary. Data comes from various
areas of NB and includes corporate data, RCP division data, and external data from secondary
sources and organizational partners. Types of data analyzed include emails, strategy documents,
presentations, press releases, annual reports, and NB-initiated studies by external research
partners. Organizational documents were acquired directly from NB with the top leadership
team’s agreement. The researcher partnered with NB’s Chief Development Officer Richard
Davies to acquire access to the data through an official letter (sent via email) and a conversation
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about the proposed research. Davies provided access to historical data, as well as access to
future data, including the numerous consumer and market studies for the RCP brand that were in
process. He agreed to the objectives of the research and research question, and has been
extremely supportive of the effort, offering to help the researcher with any needs that arose
during the process. All information provided is owned solely by NB. Throughout the study, the
researcher and Mr. Davies discussed the research and its progress.
The research data is both qualitative and quantitative, and represents learnings and firm
outcomes from 2003–2016. RCP entered the Chinese market in 2003, so the data offers deep
insights into key elements of the marketing mix at different points of time in the strategy
implementation. Access to previous and future consumer research studies were specifically
useful, as RCP performed several ch/user studies over an 18-month period and the resulting data
was useful to the topic at hand. Newell Brands agreed to provide these studies, along with each
study’s survey instruments, responses, and transcripts. The Appendices (section 7) provide
details on the RCP documents provided, including consumer studies and key information such as
sample size, survey type, and respondent type. Additional secondary data—including press
releases, annual reports, and articles on NB—were also used to better understand and
contextualize the findings. The entirety of this data gives an historical view into NB managers’
decision making, as well as into how the marketing mix began and how its 4P elements were
realized or emerged.
As RCP’s (previous) SVP of Marketing, the researcher was both a stakeholder and
contributor in the marketing mix development for the brand. This allowed the opportunity to
initiate an historical study before the outcomes of the change process had become apparent. As
the marketing leader on a different category in Newell Brands, the researcher continues to
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observe the marketing mix emergence and knowledge acquisition activities in real-time as they
unfold in the field setting (Van De Ven, 2007). Crucially, because the researcher did not have
prior knowledge of all the outcomes of the organizational change, personal or preconceived
biases were avoided. The combination of archival, retrospective, and real-time data is a key
characteristic of this study.
3.3 Methodology
To best comprehend how NB’s marketing mix elements emerged over time, the study uses an
explanatory longitudinal single case study method that lets the researcher reconstruct behavior
after the fact (Yin, 1994). Several considerations led to the choice of this approach. First, the
main research question seeks to understand how the marketing strategy emerges through
knowledge acquisition, and the case study method best aligns with answering how questions
(Yin, 1994). Second, the goal is to understand this strategy emergence in a real-world context.
Further, given the data available, there is no behavior control requirement (via experiments), but
rather a requirement to understand the behaviors and how they influence elements of the
marketing mix and RCP performance outcomes.
The study analyzes the data in four steps that align with Mintzberg and Waters’ approach to
understanding the emerging strategy of a retail firm (1985). First, based on the case study’s
longitudinal nature, the study used observation and data collection to develop chronologies of the
decisions and actions shaping RCPs marketing mix. In this phase, the researcher identified
trends and events, and evaluated the overall performance of RCP’s entry into China. In this step,
data collection focused on both US and China strategies. This initial analysis let the researcher
identify when the initial marketing mix was formed—along with the knowledge shaping each
element—providing a full historical view of the RCP entry into China.
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Next, based on the patterns of RCP decisions and actions, the study identified four stages in
the marketing strategy, labeling each stage on a time scale (see Figure 6). By collecting and
organizing the data based on decisions made and key activities implemented, a clearer view of
RCPs marketing mix began emerging. Major periods in the firm’s history provided evidence that
the market launch strategy emerged, changed, and developed over time.
The researcher next investigated each period more thoroughly, probing organizational
records, strategy documents, and RCP market research studies. Of specific interest were key
announcements or organizational changes that might influence the strategy. The goal was to
explain the major stimulus of each periodic transition and identify the underlying causes of
strategic shifts. In this context, major transitions were identified as significant changes in the
marketing launch strategy via decisions made or actions taken to optimize the marketing mix.

Figure 7. Phases of the RCP marketing launch strategy.

Finally, the study drew on the literature to identify the concepts shaping the strategy. With
input from faculty advisors, the researcher interpreted the data and how it tied to theory and/or
concepts, and then ideated various approaches to interpret and best explain the events in each
phase. As in Mintzberg & Rogers (1985), the study identified which of the 4Ps were emergent
versus deliberate in each step; the goal was to explain the pattern and why the strategy changed.
The study also identified the marketing mix’s key concepts and the types of knowledge
acquisition informing both the mix and the identification of emergent versus deliberate strategies.
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This research presents the results and conclusions, using the methodology described above to
analyze RCP’s marketing mix formation. Overall, Mintzberg’ s analogy of the potter (1988) was
apparent. The potter—in this case, RCP—embarked, experienced unintended outcomes, and
refined its market launch strategy accordingly. Actors were learning. As the following results
show, their knowledge acquisition activities and behaviors influenced the strategy throughout the
process.
4.0 RESULTS
The following represents the researcher’s analysis of the emergent marketing mix as RCP
began its entry into China from 2003–2016. As described above, the data analysis is organized in
four temporal stages (see Figure 7). These stages highlight the key decisions and actions shaping
the strategy and the inflection points leading to modifications in the marketing mix. The research
identifies key challenges and brings to light opportunities for the market launch strategy based on
the knowledge acquisition activities and behaviors in each stage. It further describes how the
marketing mix was impacted (or not) and, specifically, which portions of the mix were realized
or emerged. Finally, the study uses the peformance monitoring process in knowledge
acquisition’s sensing/searching concept to understand the results of the firm’s response to the
strategy changes.
4.1 Overview
NB’s approach to developing the RCP marketing strategy occured in four phases:
1. Export Model (2003–2010): A test-and-learn, opportunistic approach to the Chinese
market launch. The initial marketing mix was informed by the current strategy and macro
trends in North America.
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2. Go Local (2011–2012): NB identifies RCP as an important brand for geographic
expansion and sends a local management team to Shanghai to lead the China launch
effort. A new marketing mix emerges, informed by experiential learnings from the
internal sales team, customers, and distributors.
3. Establish the Core (2013–2016): NB retains new marketing leadership, forms a new
organizational structure, and establishes a common framework for market development
grounded in consumer insights. It applies this grafted framework to validate whether the
marketing mix is relevant for Chinese ch/uers. It begins with a formal learning plan to
provide the RCP team with ch/user insights aimed at identifying which marketing mix
elements should remain and which should be altered for local needs.
4. Global–Local/Glocal (2017 & beyond): NB launches the second phase of the grafted
learning plan. It augmented the quantitative learning with ethnographic research to
understand the key attributes driving cleaning and refuse product relevance. This
provided robust ch/user insights, explained the “values” of clean, and highlighted the
differences between China and the US. These insights further informed RCP’s marketing
mix elements.

4.2 China Launch—Export Model (2003–2010)
4.2.1 China’s market landscape: ripe for RCP launch. In 2003, NB launched the RCP
brand into China. Given China’s GDP growth expectations and significant infrastructure growth,
the TMT was confident that NB could handily achieve growth by launching this market. The
opportunities seemed endless. RCP’s top management saw RCP as “a perfect fit to ride the
growth with the Chinese market.” (#2) Numerous economic factors and trends supported the
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desire to launch. Infrastructure projects were increasing throughout the country, specifically in
major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. (#2) International and local hotel properties, office
buildings, malls, hospitals, and airports—all key verticals in which RCP held a significant
market share in North America—were also increasing. It seemed like the perfect storm, and it
helped assure NB of RCP’s potential for success in the Chinese region; after all, similar trends
had driven the growth of the North American business in its onset. Regarding the new venture,
as one manager recalls, “the goal was to get an RCP mop and bucket in every hand” across
China based on a “build it and they will come mentality.” (#4)
The idea appeared simple and intuitive enough: given the seemingly boundless rise of
new properties, NB’s management assumed that the need for cleaning services would also rise
and thus lead to a growing demand for premium, high-quality cleaning and refuse tools.
Conservative projections were aimed at $100M revenue growth across five key verticals
(hospitality, property management, health care, manufacturing, and food service) within five
years of launch. Because RCP had achieved remarkable success in the US—it had the #1 market
share in cleaning and refuse categories—management posited that, given its thriving economy, a
similar success story could be written in China.
At the time of launch, China’s market size for RCP’s core categories was $2.2B. Given
high fragmentation—77 local and international competitors made up only 10% of the market
(#4)—China was ripe for an international entrant in the category. NB posited that, if RCP
achieved a market share in China similar to what it enjoyed in the US, China would be a
$300M+ growth opportunity. Such opportunities were few and far between across the NB
portfolio. China’s economy was second only to the US, and its urban population was growing
significantly, which opened up continued opportunities for the RCP product portfolio. Another
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key growth indicator was the Chinese hotel market, which AT Kearney forecasted would grow
near 10% annually through 2022 (#2), offering a siginificant opportunity for RCP compared to
developed markets. Tourism was expected to rise, with 2.9 billion trips in 2012 and 10% yearover-year growth; trip expenditures were also expected to grow. China’s National Tourism
Administration identified a “growing demand for luxurious accommodation from affluent
Chinese consumers” and highlighted China as the world’s third most popular destination after
France and the US. (#2)
RCP’s key international customers were developing strategic growth plans for China as
well. InterContinental Hotels Group forecasted that, by 2025, China would surpass the US as its
largest market (based on number of rooms). Starwood expected to double its footprint by 2015,
while Sheraton planned to open approximately one hotel every three weeks in the Chinese
market through 2017. Commercial properties, such as office buildings and malls, were on the
rise in both square footage and number of properties. RCP had many international contracts with
hotel properties, mall developers, and property management firms (such as CBRE). RCP
management believed that these contracts could be enforced with the local Chinese buyers, so
the selling process would be very straightforward and similar to that in the US.
4.2.2 Review of knowledge acquisition realized in Export Model phase—congenital
learning. Prior to entering the Chinese market, NB did little research or groundwork to validate
the RCP opportunity in China. Management determined that cleaning was “universal” and
decided to launch the full US product offering into China using the US marketing mix. Given
China’s significant growth rates, speed to market was given priority. By applying the 4Ps of the
US marketing mix to China, RCP entered the market quickly, confident it would experience
immediate growth. NB set up a Hong Kong sales office and hired 19 sales people, training the
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teams on product, and providing them with US product catalogs. RCP had officially entered
China.
In this phase, the market entry strategy was quite simple: build a sales force—known as
“feet on the street”—and ensure product availability through distributors. The sales force
decided to target distributors supplying paper products (such as 3M), as these products were sold
in hotels, offices, and other properties that RCP was targeting. This appeared to be the best
approach, as “cleaning products could ride the truck” with consumable products that building
service contractors and properties ordered on a regular basis. The teams focused on opening new
accounts and aimed their efforts at landing orders for new construction and building renovation
projects. By achieving opening orders for new builds and renovations, the team assumed the
replenishment orders would follow. The sales team was able to secure new projects, however,
loyalty and replenishment orders proved difficult.
Another key piece of the strategy focused on key international accounts—such as IHG,
Starwood, Yum Brands, and McDonald’s—that RCP had relationships and contracts with in the
US. The management team believe these contracts would be viable in the Chinese market, thus
providing the opportunity for an immediate customer base in China. This core belief of the
Export Model strategy informed NB’s decision to keep the 4Ps in China similar to those in the
US marketing mix.
4.2.3 RCPs initial entry marketing mix. As previously mentioned, RCP market entry
and business model for China was informed by the success built in North America, and thus few
adaptations were made for the new market. Three key factors drove this reasoning: 1) Many of
the properties developed in China were international hotels that RCP already had global contracts
with, so the team felt it would be relatively “turn-key” to enforce these contracts in the region. 2)
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An assumption was made about the “universal nature” of the cleaning process and the tools
required to clean properties. 3) Management believed that Chinese ch/users would value cleaning
tools from a US brand that were made in the US, and that RCP could set the standard for
cleaning tools in the market. Following is a detailed view of RCPs initial marketing mix, which
was informed by congenital learning—that is, it was grounded and informed by RCP’s processes
in and current understanding of the North American market.
4.2.3.1. Product. RCP’s entire North American catalog of more than 10,000 items—98%
of which were manufactured in the US—was immediately offered to distributors in China. The
products offered in China were not adapted for local users or the local properties in which they
were used. The breadth of RCP’s product offering was deemed an advantage in North America;
as a salesperson noted, that breadth established RCP as a

“one stop shop for North American distributors, who did not want to purchase cleaning
and refuse products from multiple manufacturers, reduced the complexity and cost of
doing business with multiple brands.” (#2)

In North America, based on market needs, the size of the RCP catalog and product offering grew
over many years. In China, the 10,000-item catalog was problematic for sales team members, as
it made it difficult for them to focus on the “core” product offering, offer recommendations, and
build assortments or solutions for specific customers. Given this, they sold items
opportunistically, allowing distributors and property owners to skim catalogs and “cherry pick”
the line.
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4.2.3.2. Pricing. During the Export Model phase, RCP priced its products as a straight
conversion from US pricing to Chinese currency. This put RCP products at a significant price
premium compared to the competition—especially locally made products. It was not difficult for
choosers to find substitutes for the RCP product offerings, as hundreds of Chinese manufacturers
were making similar products. Although the quality of local manufacturers was not nearly to
RCP’s standard, the product form and functionality was similar, and RCP did little to validate
why its brand was superior for the market and thus worth the premium price. On average, RCP
was charging a 100–200% price premium for like products in the local market. Beyond list
pricing, RCP terms favored the North American business model. Chinese distributors were
invoiced in US dollars and responsible to pay freight and duties. Payment terms were cash in
advance to 60 days, yet lead times on products were two to six months. RCPs approach to list
pricing plus additional duties was extremely uncompetitive and burdensome for local business
owners.
4.2.3.3. Place. Similar to the North American strategy, products were broadly available
across mainland China, without a specific focus on regions or key major cities. Beyond
geography, RCP did not initially prioritize specific verticals to focus entry efforts, so sales teams
were expected to target the same nine verticals in which RCP played in North America. This was
a broad target and geography for the 19 sales managers to cover; by comparison, the North
American sales team had hundreds of sales managers to service the nine verticals across that
(much smaller) region. Because RCP operates under a B2B model, the focus in China was to
open as many distributors as possible, with little consideration about the type of distributors. In
summary, NB applied a broad-based approach to the place element of the RCP marketing mix.
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4.2.3.4. Promotion. As with the other marketing mix elements, RCP adopted the current
North American promotional model. In 2003, RCP was an established brand in North America
built over 45 years. US promotion efforts were thus focused primarily on the trade (i.e., the
choosers) via selling events, trade shows, and catalog distribution/mailings. The North American
business was built over time via relationships between distributors and the sales team, which was
extremely seasoned; many sales people had been in their postions for 10–20 years. As a result,
little priority was given to advertising or to awareness- and trial-building efforts. In the US, RCP
benefited from high brand awareness (90% aided), partly due to the strength of the Rubbermaid
consumer brand, which had mass distribution of a range of products in mass retailers across the
US and Canada.
Despite having low brand awareness in China, NB adopted a promotional model similar
to that in the US. The focus was based on trade shows, catalog distribution, and professional
seminars. The sales team worked to build relationships with key distributors, which proved
difficult given the product and pricing disadvantages compared to local competitors. The brand
also participated in more than 20 trade shows a year to provide catalogs and meet directly with
new distributors and property owners. Table 4 summarizes NB’s Export Model marketing mix.
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Table 4. Marketing Mix—Export Model

Product

US product only
10,000+ item product
line

Marketing Mix 2003–2010
Export Model
Pricing
Promotion
US pricing in US
Catalogs
currency
Significant premium
(100–200%) vs. local
market
Customer responsible
for US customs,
duties, and taxes
Cash-in-advance
payment terms

Seminars
Tradeshows

Place
All cleaning and
paper products
distributors
All verticals
All of mainland
China

Manufacturer’s
website

4.2.4 Performance monitoring of organizational results. Initially, NB specifically
monitored RCP performance in China on key metrics such as sales revenue and market share.
Although the brand experienced revenue growth from 2003–2010, the sales were extremely
small relative to the market size of $2.2B USD. Sales growth was not pacing with the category or
GDP growth, and RCP attained less than a 1% market share over seven years. In 2008, sales
plateaued at approximately $8M (see Table 5). During the Export Model period, sales were
sustained mostly through new property openings rather than reorders or replenishment from
previous customers. Therefore, the current marketing mix elements did not achieve a sustainable
growth model.
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Table 5. RCP Revenue Results (#2)
2003–2008
Net Sales (in millions)

Data unavailable

YOY Growth
Market Share

N/A

2008–2010
Average Annual Sales
$8.0M
Flat YOY Growth
< .5%

4.2.4 Summary—Export Model phase. During this phase, few changes were made to
the marketing mix 4Ps, despite feedback from the sales team and its key customers. The
organization continued to focus on opening new accounts, and on new construction and
renovation opportunities. The RCP management team at that time did little to understand why the
business was underperforming; it simply assumed the sales force was inexperienced and needed
additional training or perhaps was not the right talent at all. No additional resources or
investment were put into the region. During this time period, the division treated the Chinese
market opportunistically rather than strategically. Because RCP was performing well and driving
consistent growth in North America, there was little urgency or priority to fix the China strategy.
RCP operated the region at status quo and, given the past performance, planned the China
business at nominal growth rates.
4.3 China Launch—Go Local (2011–2012)
As the above discussion shows, during the first phase, RCP was quite difficult to do business
with and did not appropriate resources to determine how to succeed in the Chinese market. At
the time, the RCP leadership team niavely assumed that the North American marketing mix
would work in the region and that the market’s macro trends would ensure continual sales
growth. This strategy did not show a deep understanding of the context of doing business with
Chinese distributors or of how to meet local users’ needs. So, despite macro trends, infrastructure
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growth, and an increasing China GDP—all of which point in favor of RCP—the desired business
results did not follow.
4.3.1 Changes in NB’s top management team. In 2011, NB hired a new CEO with
signficiant global experience in product and advertising development. In an NB investor press
release announcing his appointment, the new CEO highlighted his aspiration for the NB portfolio
to grow in developed and emerging markets:

“I am honored to be joining Newell. The company has a strong portfolio of brands and an
excellent leadership team with a great opportunity to win in both the developed and emerging
markets.” (Neff, 2011)

Upon his arrival, a new corporate strategy was developed, coined the Growth GamePlan (see
Figure 8). This growth plan highlighted the organization’s ambition to position key brands for
geographic expansion, specifically in emerging markets. Identified as “Extend Beyond Our
Borders,” this part of the GGP focused specifically on Asia and Latin America. The vision was to
give these key brands the resources, people, and insights needed to drive exponential growth
outside of their home markets. This beyond-borders extension was not meant for all brands in the
portfolio; instead, the GGP identified specific brands that NB leadership believed were poised
for growth. An NB leader explained the plan for these “win bigger” brands as follows:

“…. the aim is for them to drive growth at the division over the next five years. A big
part of the strategy will be the development of these brands in emerging markets. 80% of
Sharpie’s sales, for example, are generated in the North American market. The short-
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term objective is to now develop Sharpie in Latin America, building on the relative
strength of Paper Mate in that region.” (2012 Annual Report, 2013)
As Figure 8 shows, RCP was identified as a win bigger business. Based on this classification, it
was a corporate priority for RCP to accelerate its growth in both the Asian and Latin American
markets. An optimized strategic plan for RCP China was identified as a key priority to better
meet the needs of ch/users in the market. The TMT also identified the investment and resources
that would be required to deliver this global growth across all win bigger brands.
NB quantified the incremental investment needed in sales and marketing efforts to deliver
sustainable growth in emerging markets (see Figure 9). To fund this investment, NB planned to
identify sensible ways to reduce costs in developed markets to fund the resource requirements of
launching into emerging markets. This was a significant shift for the organization for two
reasons. First, in the past, individual divisions or brands made discreet decisions around their
own specific global growth strategies—something corporate leadership was now prescribing.
Second, divisions with new-market expansion plans were not previously given additional
resources to do so; rather, they were expected to self-fund their expansion. In this new model,
NB planned to over-invest in win bigger businesses, funded by cost-cutting measures across the
portfolio. It also emphasized a local approach in the new markets: “local needs and local price
points” (see Figure 9). This new approach required a significant shift in the RCP Chinese
expansion, along with a review of its marketing mix elements.
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Figure 8. Newell’s Growth Game Plan. ("Newell Rubbermaid - Barclays Back-toSchool Consumer Conference," 2013)

Figure 9. Newell’s focus on emerging market investment. ("Newell Rubbermaid Barclays Back-to-School Consumer Conference," 2013)
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4.3.2 Review of knowledge acquisition behaviors—experiential. The new NB
leadership believed that RCP had the potential to be a big player in the Chinese market. Macro
economic trends were still favorable for the RCP business model and product portfolio, yet little
research or data had been used to validate the opportunity. Given the new corporate strategy and
the RCP brand’s disappointing sales and penetration in the market over the previous eight years,
NB’s TMT decided to establish a new leadership team for the China RCP business and sent top
high-potential talent to the region. These leaders possessed successful track records in other
divisions in developed markets; they were sent as expatriates to evaluate the China marketing
strategy and make recommendations on driving growth and strategy refinement. They were then
expected to execute their recommendations and deliver exponential growth to the organization.
This team was also entrusted to lead the existing local teams and ensure they had the training and
skills needed for success. NB leaders deemed ears and feet on the ground as necessary to get the
region on track.
One of the first decisions the new leadership team made was to move the RCP division office
from Hong Kong to Shanghai so that it would be physically operating in the local market. It also
hired local talent for key positions, though many members of the top leadership team in areas
such as General Management, Sales, Finance, and Marketing were employees relocated from the
US or other developed markets. As described in the next section, the new team immediately
worked to gain a better understanding of RCP’s performance and the challenges to be overcome
in China. These learnings were garnered through first-hand experiences spending time in the
field and on sales calls, and through discussions with RCP’s internal sales team and with
distributors and key choosers from international MNCs.
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4.3.3 Challenges with the Export Model marketing mix. Throughout this phase of
RCP’s launch into China, experiential learning was taking place. The new leadership team and
local sales team consistently received feedback from distributors and customers on the pros and
cons of doing business with RCP. Overall, the feedback was challenging; in addition to
introducing a western, developed marketing mix into the under-developed Chinese market, RCP
also made it extremely difficult for local Chinese owners and operators to do business with the
firm. Policies put in place were advantageous for the firm, but did not favor local choosers or set
up RCP for sustainable growth. Following are summaries of some key experiential learnings that
RCP employees gained about the Export Model marketing mix elements.
4.3.3.1. Product. RCP definitely had an opportunity to leverage the marketing mix’s
product area. Although customers had many positive things to say about the brand and its
products, challenges existed and needed to be addressed. Still, distributors and choosers noted
that market dynamics and elevated operating standards were opening a door for premium
products such as RCP in the refuse and cleaning categories:

“Higher-value products are preferred. Complicated and rigorous working conditions
demand better durability and functionality. High hygiene standards are applied in
properties which thus demand better durability and safety.” (#4)

Many distributors understood RCP’s performance and quality, yet they were not always valued
or understood by local customers, many of whom preferred local brands despite the positive RCP
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proposition. It also appeared that Chinese choosers were not decidedly loyal to any one brand.
Two local distributors summarized the situation as follows:

“RCP products have strong awareness and performance only in global chain accounts due
to their mature operation and quality-inspection system, which help properly showcase
RCP’s value. Local competitors—such as Safco, Baiyun, and Chaobao—have similar
products and are preferred by local chains.” (#4)

“RCP products have the best quality, especially in the refuse segement, but the focus is
less on brands than product qualities. If relevant cleaning products produced by local
manufacturers have almost the same quality as RCP, local products are preferred.” (#4)

Further, despite acknowledging RCP’s value, local competitors received accolades for
their attention to services beyond product offerings, including trainings and certifications. These
competitors typically visited choosers more often and identified ways to service accounts beyond
replenishment and replacement orders. RCP was finding it difficult to build these strategic
partnerships and relationships. In addition, local manufacturers were nimble and more than
willing to manufacture customer-specific requests and product adaptations. Because RCP
manufacturing operations were based solely in the US, it was impossible to react and adapt as
quickly as local competitors. One distributor discussed the needs of local accounts and how this
compared to those of international accounts:
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“Local chain accounts value SOP [standard operating procedures], leasing, and services
that better support brand quality and a professional image; global chain accounts do not
value such add-on services due to their mature operations and quality inspection
systems.” (#4)

Another distributor described the value of local competitors and their commitment to service:

“Local brands are willing to provide differentiating products and services. They offer
regular visits to introduce product knowledge and customer insights—one to two times
per month—and timely response (within three days) to inquiries about product quality or
logistics…. Baiyun and Trust are observed to visit distributors every time a batch of
products is delivered.” (#4)

4.3.3.2. Place. Although RCP quality and brand awareness among many distributors were
strong, customers were clearly disappointed with other elements of the marketing mix—
specifically, brand availability and pricing. These challenges were hindering the firm’s ability to
grow through repeat users. Distributors were reluctant to recommend RCP due to unstable lead
times, which directly affected a property’s daily operations. RCP’s service was unpredictable.
Distributors had their reputations to protect and it would reflect poorly on them if they were
unable to deliver to their customers’ expectations. As one wholesaler noted, “RCP does not have
full SKUS, and unstable lead times affect a store’s daily operations.” (#4)
The logistical challenges and long lead times were caused by US manufacturing, which
was a key element of the current market strategy. Even key international accounts that RCP had
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global contracts with highlighted their need for relationships with multiple brand manufacturers.
This unpredictability was negatively impacting a key tenant of RCP’s initial entry strategy: to
leverage long-standing US relationships with global brands. One key international customer
described the need to work with local competitors, despite contractual agreements with RCP in
the US:

“RCP is the best brand in the world, with long and stable relationship with McDonald's.
However RCP is weak in logistics and supply, which is the main reason we have other
MNC suppliers.” (#4)

Beyond logistics challenges, it was obvious that Chinese choosers did not feel required to
uphold global contracts. RCP had pricing and placement agreements with many global hotel
brands and food service properties. In the US, these contracts were upheld and enforced with
regional buying teams, and it was extremely rare for a chooser to deviate from a global contract.
The new China leadership team was surprised to learn that these key accounts did not have
similar compliance measures outside the US, where brands and product specfications in MNC
procurement catalogs were more of a suggestion than a requirement. A major coffee chain and
key US customer gave its local China teams full control of brand and supplier decisions:

“Global HQ decides the product models and material requirements and the China
sourcing department decides the brand and suppliers.”(#4)
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4.3.3.3. Promotion. As previously discussed, RCP executed a limited promotional
strategy and relied mostly on trade shows, catalog mailings, and its own website to build brand
awareness. This strategy, paired with strong selling relationships, was a successful model for the
US. However, with such limited brand awareness in China, additional tactics to grow the brand
were needed. A big gap identified by the new China leadership was the need to provide products
for trial and testing. Based on RCP’s premium price points, many buyers wanted their users to
test the products and interact with them prior to purchase. Such trialing could help substantiate
RCP’s premium pricing, illustrating the higher quality and superior product design compared to
the competition. Further, RCP’s competitors had sophisticated and frequent trial programs
focused on local businesses. These local businesses had limited financial resources, so it was
important for choosers and users to interact with new products first-hand prior to investing in
them. One distributor explained how RCP’s competitors approached this:

“The brand supplier visits with free trial products, which is valued by local buyers as it
helps with brand awareness and promotion, better product knowledge and understanding,
and quality evaluation…. Trust, Baiyun, and Miajie [competitors] all provide free trial
products for distributors to try, or they give them out to end buyers to pitch new
customers on product upgrades.” (#4)

The power of word-of-mouth was also a key factor that RCP had not previously taken
into account. Chinese distributors, while competitors, are a tight-knit community. Many of them
had built their businesses along side of each other and were self-made. They compared notes on a
brand’s quality, service, pricing, and so on. Many communicated not only face to face, but also
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through a Chinese social networking site called WeChat. Experiences with specific brands would
be posted online and shared for their distributor networks to see. Speaking of manufacturer sites
and social sites, one distributor noted the following:

“The internet is an important source for primary brand and product information collection
immediately after hearing of a brand and product for the manufacturing end buyer.” (#4)

Due to word-of-mouth on social networks, RCP’s logistical challenges became widely known
across the distributor community, which created barriers to opening new customers.

4.3.3.4. Price. Based on many of the issues described above, RCP’s 100–200% pricing
premium and additional business costs, such as duties and terms, were difficult for Chinese
choosers to justify when compared to the competition:

“A reasonable retail price, not exceeding the buyer’s highest acceptable price, is
important in order to justify brand choice.” (#4)

This was an additional hindrance for the sales team in opening new accounts and
sustaining current customers. The new RCP China leadership team analyzed all product sales
between 2003 and 2011 and found that approximately 80% of those sales were realized with a
price exception or discount. Leadership decided that pricing must be addressed for RCP to be
competitive. Even customers with pricing contracts expected their local teams to engage in a
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rigorous bidding process to achieve the best price and did not accept contract pricing at face
value. A distributor highlighted this process as follows:

“Once global chains identify preferred brands for procurement, local teams adopt a
bidding process to acheive lowest price. In China, the sourcing department has the most
decision power in this bidding process.” (#4)

4.3.4 Summary of experiential learnings. The new RCP China leadership team
acquired invaluable learnings through both first-hand experience and the experiences of local
sales teams. The leadership team identified many opportunities for improvement and took
immediate actions across all elements of the marketing mix based on its findings. Although the
2003 initial marketing mix provided a foundational framework for the brand, it did not account
for the local nuances of the Chinese market. That initial approach applied a strategy
implemented by an established brand in a developed market; the variables simply were not the
same in China, where the brand was scarcely known and the cleaning and refuse requirements of
local ch/users were not as sophisticated as in a developed market. Unlike in the US, China had
no formal cleaning standards or operating procedures, no governing bodies to regulate cleaning
standards, and no recycling/refuse collection efforts. Therefore, most of the RCP product
offering was deemed unnecessary. This became apparent when the new China leadership team
analyzed the product mix sold in the region since 2003. Of the 10,000 products offered in the
RCP catalog, only 954 were actually ordered—and an even smaller number were consistently
reordered. Clearly, the broad product offering was not translating to the local market. Table 6
summarizes the experiential learnings from this phase
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Table 6. Summary of Experiential Learnings
Market Entry Strategy

Product

Place

Full RCP NA Product portfolio available to the Chinese market
which consisted over 10,000 items.
Products were shipped from US and RCP communicated a 2- 6
month lead time.
Cleaning & Paper Products Distributors across all verticals in
Mainland China.
Pricing was a straight conversion from US pricing to Chinese
currency, resulting in a 100% -200% premium versus market
average price.

Price

Payment terms ranged from cash in advance to 60 days payment
upon order placed.
Payment terms – all payments required in US $ currency

Promotion

Limited marketing tools were created by the RCP marketing team.
Solely the basics were provided such as RCP catalogs (in
English), trade shows, seminars, and website.

Experiential Learning
Only 946 unique products of the 10,000 skus were ordered over the
9 year period.
Less than 20% of the 946 items were considered “hero” or "leading"
products of the brand as defined by NA sales.
Distributors were able to get similar products from competitors in 30
days or less.
A total of 18 distributors listed RCP products and sold to end-users.
Majority of sales were in top 5 cities.
70% of orders received included some sort of pricing exception with
an average discount of 35%.
Distributors were self-made businessmen with little cash on hand
and unable to pay cash in advance, especially considering the 2-6
lead time.
Few distributors had the ability to pay for products in US currency.
Distributors were unable to justify the premium price of the product
based on limited product knowledge and training.
Sales team was not equipped with appropriate selling tools.
Little brand awareness of RCP brand outside of the international
firms.

4.3.5 The NEW Go-Local marketing mix. Based on the leadership team’s experiential
learnings, a new marketing mix emerged. The RCP leadership team took immediate action to
optimize each 4P element to better align with the market’s needs. One essential high-level
principle the team applied to the marketing mix was focus. The initial marketing mix mirrored
the US market, which was fully developed and had significantly more resources than the China
region. To be successful in China, the leadership team decided to narrow the market entry
approach—specifically in relation to product offering and place (distribution)—to better suit the
needs of the sales team, distributors, and ch/users. The product offering was minimized to a core
offering targeted to the hospitality and property management verticals. By focusing specifically
on two verticals, rather than nine, the sales and marketing teams could hone their efforts and
deepen their knowledge. Further, to help the sales team make more salient recommendations to
their customers, new selling tools were developed.
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The logistical challenges that customers had highlighted encouraged the RCP leadership
team to request resources to open a local distribution center in Shanghai. NB granted this
request, and the distribution center was born. It housed 528 core products, dramatically
upgrading their availability: products that previously took anywhere from two to six months
when shipping from the US were now available in three to seven days. This gave distributors
confidence in recommending RCP products and touting the reliability of its operations.
Pricing was also adjusted during this phase. Not only did the leadership lower list prices
by 30%, it changed billing to local currency and made payment terms more acceptable to small
business owners. RCP also took on the customs and freight payments, which customers were
previously expected to pay. These pricing changes put RCP at a much more acceptable pricing
strategy in relation to its competitors. Although still priced at a premium, leadership viewed this
premium as warranted given RCP products’ superior quality, functionality, and design. The
leadership further realized that it was critical for ch/users to experience this product quality firsthand. It therefore put trialing programs in place to get products in the hands of potential ch/users.
The marketing team identified 10 iconic RCP products and developed a trial program that
let users experience these products for free. These programs not only provided the products, but
also training documents and videos to teach users how to use them appropriately. Sales team
members then scheduled follow-up visits to ensure that customers were satisfied with their
experiences; the sales team could then immediately convert those experiences into orders. RCP
also developed PR and activation initiatives focused on building brand awareness and solidifying
its expert status in the cleaning industry. Table 7 shows a summary of the 4Ps for the new
marketing mix.
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Table 7. Marketing Mix—Go Local
Marketing Mix Strategy
2011-2012
GO LOCAL
Product
Pricing
Continued with US
Lowered prices by
developed and manufactured approximately 30% which
product only
closed gap to market pricing,
resulting in a 20% premium
to market average
Limited focus to 528 core
Changed billing to local
products versus 10,000 items currency and improved
payment terms to 45 days

New product offering
specifically focused on
Property Management and
Hospitality verticals

RCP took on payment
responsibility of freight and
duties

Promotion
PR and Marketing activation
focused on building brand
awareness and industry
expertise

Place
Opened local Shanghai
warehouse to improve
product availability to
distributors 3-7 days (versus
2 - 6 months)
Initiated Trial Programs to
43 Distributors targeted
get products in
Property Management and
users/choosers hands to
Hospitality Verticals with a
experience the superior
focus on international
quality and functionality of the contracts
brand
New selling tools developed Focused sales force on top 5
to support sales team in
cities versus all of mainland
recommending ideal products China
for Hospitality and Property
Management verticals

4.3.6 Performance monitoring of organizational results. These changes improved the
brand’s revenue growth trajectory in China. Sales that previously plateaued at $8M began
showing signs of reinvigoration. Distributors responded positively to the RCP improvements.
Relocating the office and building a warehouse in Shanghai showed local customers that RCP
was making a long-term investment in the region. RCP gained creditability with the customer
base, and local sales team members gained confidence in their selling abilities due to better
pricing and training tools. These were positive signs, and NB’s management continued to invest
in RCP to build the brand in the market.
Table 8. Sales Results 2012–2013 (#2)
Net Sales (in millions)
YOY Growth

2012
$8.20
—

2013
$10.6
+28%
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4.4 China Launch—Establish the Core (2013–2016)
The new RCP China marketing strategy was building momentum. However, while the
leadership team was gaining knowledge through its experience on the ground, it had very little
expertise launching in foreign markets. So, while its understanding of the market was growing
and the marketing mix elements were optimized, the team’s approach nonetheless contained a
good amount of trial and error and it was taking some time to get up to speed. NB, however,
expected the team to move quickly to leverage the Chinese market’s opportunities.
In 2013, NB’s CEO appointed a new leadership team underneath him and announced a
new structure to operationalize the GGP. The corporate strategy was in full effect, and the
organization continued to put significant emphasis on expanding the priority brands’ geographic
footprint. In a 2014 trade article, a new leadership team member highlighted the current CEO’s
progress in emerging markets:

“He sped up the marketing group within emerging markets in Asia and South America.
He doubled the ad budget and doubled the market research investment. It’s all toward
creating a brand and innovation led company famous for great design and product
performance.” (Overby, 2014)

Leadership’s desire to build a strong foothold outside the US remained strong, but they began to
realize that NB needed local talent, specifically in marketing:

“About 71% of our business is in North America, but we see significant opportunities
particularly in South America and Asia. We are building marketing hubs in Sao Paolo and
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Shanghai, as well as in London. We’re recruiting local professionals to help us on that
journey. Our ability to be able to build marketing hubs in the future will be critical.”
(2012 Annual Report, 2013)

Many of the new NB leaders had strong consumer packaged goods (CPG) backgrounds,
including at Unilever, Kraft, and P&G. One key leadership team hire was Chief Marketing and
Insights Officer Richard Davies, who had strong marketing expertise and previous experience in
launching new markets, specifically in Asia:

“Davies proven track record of creating brands and bringing innovation to the consumer
combined with his experiences living and working in markets around the world, make
him the ideal leader to take Newell Rubbermaids’s marketing and innovation agenda to
the next level…. Richard is a noted expert on the consumer market in East Asia and has
lived and worked across the region in his 30 year career.” (Neff, 2014)

Davies noted his passion for building brands outside of US, and said he was keen to apply his
experiences to NB:

“I was lucky at Unilever to work in Japan. The Japanese consumer is one of the most
discerning in the world. The quality of work in Japan is incredibly high, and that has
conditioned them to expect very high standards. There was a sense of satisfaction in
being able to market to consumers and get it right.” (Overby, 2014)
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With Davies’ appointment, NB implemented a new marketing structure. Previously,
marketing and consumer insight talent reported through individual business segments. This
talent now reported directly to Davies, ensuring that he could personally lead the marketing
strategy for each NB business unit. This reporting structure was a departure from other CPG
companies in the industry, as well as for NB. Previously, the NB CMO was responsible for
capability building, but decisions ultimately remained with the business units. Davies did not
deem this as particularly useful in keeping marketing spend and decisions aligned with NB’s
corporate priorities:

“…(the CMO) was developing capabilities, processes and training, but the marketing
organization had no central authority. Instead it was divided among business units that
controlled their own marketing budgets and decisions… many brands were relying on
consumer-habit studies that were 10 years old. Marketing people and spend weren’t
aligned with company priorities such as growing in Asia, and Latin America…” (Overby,
2014).

The new marketing structure let Davies set the agenda for learning plans and marketing
strategies. He was extremely passionate about validating marketing mix decisions with
consumers (in RCP’s case, with ch/users). His previous experience and techniques informed new
processes and approaches for NB marketing teams. His philosophy differed from his
predecessor, and the new processes, skills, and capabilities were grafted into the organization.
4.4.1. Grafting: Developing a learning plan to inform marketing strategy. Davies
instituted new processes for market development. Throughout his career, he had launched
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brands in new markets, including China. Through his experiences in different markets and
varying roles, he developed a framework and methodology for launching into new markets. The
marketing strategies were grounded in data—specifically, in consumer insights. When reviewing
the RCP China strategy, Davies immediately ensured that priority was placed on investing in
consumer understanding, which he viewed as critical to success for all marketers:

“The reality is that a lot marketers are not overly interested in understanding the
consumer. They are just paying lip service to the consumer. But at the end of the day, it’s
the depth or complete lack of consumer understanding that will determine your success or
failure. That was true 40 years ago and it will remain true 40 years from now.” (Neff,
2014)

Over the previous eight years in China, RCP had conducted no formal research with ch/users of
cleaning and refuse products. All marketing strategy decisions had been based on the North
American strategy and, more recently, on the local team’s experiential learnings. As a result,
most information was anecdotal and not necessarily generalizable for the Chinese market as a
whole.
Under Davies’ leadership, a new approach to consumer understanding and entering new
markets was grafted onto the organization. The processes were mandatory across all of NB. In
Davies’ view, it was critical that all brands and markets in the NB portfolio apply the same
principles to understand consumers and inform the marketing mix:
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“My predecessor was responsible for marketing as a capability, developing skills and
training. I am responsible for that, but I also look after the day job of marketing. I’m
responsible for the advertising and mix development. And that’s really helpful, because as
we develop new approaches, processes, and techniques, I don’t need to persuade people
to do it, that it’s a good idea. I can tell them to do it. Certainly for a company our size, we
don’t have the time to go around trying to influence people that this is how they should
do things…” (Overby, 2014)

4.4.2 Sensing and searching—product quantitative testing and insights. Davies
immediately influenced the RCP China marketing mix by developing a learning plan to better
understand local consumer needs. He instituted a new process for testing products with
consumers:

“Davies wants product concepts and ad ideas tested with consumers… because
researchers are the voice of the consumer.” (Neff, 2014)

After reviewing the category and conducting local field visits, Davies voiced concerns
about the product offering’s suitability for the Chinese market. The goal was to immediately
ascertain if the current product offerings were relevant and differentiated—and solved the needs
of both choosers and users. A key facet of Davies’ new marketing structure was an independent
consumer insight function to implement learning plans and guide the methodologies used to gain
consumer insights. Davies was adamant that consumers be the voice informing strategic
direction and decisions, and the consumer insights function facilitated this:
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“You lose count of the number of companies who claim the consumer is boss, but the
question is do they really make the consumer the boss or not? I think by having a strong
independent research function you’re a hell of a lot closer to doing that.” (Overby, 2014)

Although testing product concepts with consumers was a well-known approach among
CPG companies, RCP had never tested its current products with consumers in the US or China.
Davies deemed this testing to be both critical and urgent. It was foundational—not only to
inform the China marketing mix and ensure that products were meeting Chinese ch/users’ needs,
but also to determine whether the brand should even be in China at all. The goal of the testing
was to identify whether the products currently sold in the region were the “right” ones, especially
since they were all developed in the US for US consumers. If the current product offering did
not meet the needs of local ch/users, the rest of the marketing strategy was moot as new
innovations would be required before evaluating other elements of the marketing mix. Indeed,
previous literature has shown that product innovation is central to the marketing mix elements of
global firms (Beverland et al., 2007).
Based on the need for foundational product validation, the consumer insights team built
an immediate plan to test products; it also identified other insight gaps that had to be addressed
to better inform the marketing mix and ultimately succeed in the Chinese market. An internal
memo from the consumer insights team highlights these knowledge gaps:
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“The current approach in China for RCP is to land a broad range of SKUs and see which
of these sells. Under time pressure to launch, this was considered the best option.
However, if we are to build a successful business in China, we will have to have:
i. An effective route to market.
ii. Innovations that are both differentiated and relevant to the ch/user.
In satisfying the second criteria Marketing and CMI [Consumer & Market Insights] have
undertaken work to see which propositions are more likely to satisfy the second
objective. The starting point for testing propositions has been to look at ideas already or
about to be commercialized in the US …. This brings its own challenges in that the
concepts for the most part have never been articulated, either as concept statements or
brand keys, and this work has taken some time to do.” (#3)

Beyond product concept tests, the consumer insights team identified additional data
required to build a deep understanding of the market. From Davies’ perspective, it was not ideal
to make product testing the first order of business, as the organization lacked data about the
Chinese market in the RCP categories of cleaning and refuse. The consumer insights team also
identified challenges with the testing-first approach:

“This approach contains something of a random element in that there has been no data at
all on the size of the segments, the intensity of the competition and so on, that would
inform where we would test.” (#3)
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The proposed research approach was the first of its kind for the RCP brand in China. To
date, all learnings had come from experiential learnings, informal discussions with customers,
consumers, and management teams. The RCP China leadership team was optimistic about the
context and insight that the product concept tests would provide, along with the implications for
further optimizing the marketing mix.
RCP administered product concept testing of its core product lines, defined as the North
American market’s top-selling items. A total of 31 current RCP product innovations from the
refuse and cleaning categories that were commercially successful in North America and available
in China were tested locally across the priority verticals of property management and hospitality.
Products were evaluated on functional and emotional attributes, along with key performance
indicators such as relevance, differentiation, and uniqueness. Figure 10 shows an example from
the test (the example is translated into English; all concepts were tested in Mandarin).

57

Figure 10. Example of a product concept test. (#2)

The testing resulted in a combined opportunity score that met internal action standards
derived from Davies’ previous experience. As Table 9 shows, 17 of the 31 concepts performed
well on relevance and differentiation and met NB’s new standards. This was encouraging to
Davies and the RCP marketing team; the testing showed that an assemblage of current product
offerings could be succesful in the Chinese market’s hospitality and property management
verticals. The results both validated the organization’s continued investment in the region and
highlighted a need to increase investment in awareness and trial-building efforts, specifically in
advertising. To date, there had been no broad-based marketing plans to drive awareness and trial
for RCP. Based on the concept results, NB was willing to provide the RCP marketing team the
investment required to advertise in the brand. The concept results helped guide development of a
58

local marketing campaign around five of the product offerings that tested well, were considered
relevant to local ch/users, and were differentiated from the competition. The results also guided
which verticals to target, the communcations strategy, and the campaign’s media placement.
Table 9. RCP Product Concept Test Results in China: Hospitality & Property Management
Verticals (#4, #5)

EXISTING RCP PRODUCT

W
a
v
e
1

W
a
v
e
2

HOSPITALITY
Relevent

Differentiated

Folding X-Cart
HYGEN Microfiber Flat Mop
Vented Brute
Maximizer Mop
HYGEN Series
Reach Flat Mop
Smoking Management
Classic Housekeeping Cart
Executive Series
High Capacity Cleaning Cart
Step-On Slim Jim
Utility and Maintenance Cart

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
N/A
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
No

Pass Action
Standards
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
N/A
No
No

BRUTE Utility Refuse Container
Slim Jim Container
V2 - Step-On Slim Jim Waste Container
Structural Foam Tilt Trucks
Heavy Duty Platform Trucks
Heavy Duty Utility Carts
Triple Trolley
Quick Cart
High Security Healthcare Cleaning Cart
Recycling Platform - Profit Driven
Recycling Platform - Compliance Driven
ProSave Ingredient Management System
WaveBrake Mop Bucket and Wringer System
Pulse Microfiber Mopping System (single)
Pulse Microfiber Mopping System (double)
HYGEN Disoposable Microfiber Cloths
HYGEN Microfiber
V2 - Executive Series
Microfiber Flat Mop

Yes
Yes
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N/A
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
N/A

Yes
Yes
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N/A
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
N/A

Yes
Yes
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N/A
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
N/A

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
Pass Action
Relevent
Differentiated
Standards
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
No
N/A

Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
N/A

Yes
Yes
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
Yes
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
No
N/A

4.4.3 Establish the Core marketing mix. The grafted learning plan and the
sensing/searching approach to acquiring consumer insights through the quantitative product
concept tests significantly influenced RCP’s go-forward marketing mix. The plan’s product
portion became much more focused, specifically on core products passing action standards with
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ch/users. These products became known as the “core product” offering for China. Although the
rest of the portfolio was still available for purchase, this core focus helped guide the sales team to
further prioritize product recommendations for its customers and distributors. The marketing
team created detailed training and sales materials to support the sales team in this effort. These
core products also became the main focus of all promotional efforts, including advertising, trade
show exhibits, and trial programs. This ensured that locally relevant products were appropriately
showcased to potential buyers.
The place element of the marketing mix was also reshaped. The product concepts were
specifically tested with the hospitality and property management verticals and, based on the
results, the leadership team made a clear decision to penetrate these verticals in key geographies
rather than take a broad approach. Based on market data on hotel and property management sites
and their growth forecasts, the team chose five cities as the geographic hubs for the RCP launch
effort. The sales team opened show rooms in these five cities to build a presence for the brand
and give ch/users an opportunity to interact with the core product offering first-hand. Further,
distributors could book the showroom and host customer meetings, which proved to be a great
experience for potential customers. It brought the RCP product quality and design to life and
showcased RCP’s full-solution offerings. The showrooms once again exemplified the brand’s
commitment to the Chinese market, and they were well received by the customer base. Table 10
offers an overview of the core marketing mix elements.

60

Table 10. Marketing Mix—Establish the Core
Marketing Mix Strategy
2013-2016
ESTABLISH CORE
Product
Pricing
Continued to offer 528 items, Local Pricing & Local
but focused selling efforts on Currency
core products in Refuse,
Cleaning & Mobility
categories quantitively tested
with Users & Choosers and
passed company action
standards (~200 Skus)

Promotion
Developed a new print,
outdoor & online advertising
campaign to build awareness
and trial of the brand.
Campaign focused on core
product offering and targeted
Hospitality and Property
Management verticals

Place
Narrowed selling and
distribution focus to 5 major
cities - Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and
Chengdu

Cleaning Products
specifically adapted for local
users to meet size and
usability needs

Advertising quantitatively
tested with local consumers
for persuasion and
breakthrough and passed
company action standards
Introduced 5 product
showrooms in major cities to
bring key customers and
demonstrate product
functionality and durability

Continued to focus on
Hospitality and Property
Management verticals with
International firms and added
locally run properties
5 product showrooms
located in each major city

Pricing premium adjusted and
ranged from 0% - 20%
based on product
differentiation versus market

4.4.4 Performance monitoring of organizational results. Sales continued to increase
under the new focused marketing mix. Year over year, the brand was seeing more than 30%
growth (see Table 11), which was surpassing market performance. The results heartened NB’s
management team. However, sales were still relatively small in comparison to the market size
and RCP’s total market share was less than 2%. The organization was pumping significant
investment into the initiative, and it was optimistic that the new focus on core would drive
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exponential growth in the coming years.
Table 11. RCP Revenue Results (#2)
Net Sales (revenue in millions)
YOY Growth

2015
$14.50
37%

2016
$21.00
45%

4.5 China Launch—Global/Local
Continued progress was made across the marketing mix and RCP China’s results. NB’s
executive team was encouraged with the progress, but (as noted) sales results were relatively
small in the overall market. The China management team targeted $100M in sales by 2019,
which would require a significant growth trajectory; much progress remained to be made. The
product concept results and previous experiential learnings in the export phase made it clear to
both the marketing and sales teams that core products would not be the sole driver of growth in
the marketing mix. RCP needed a localized approach to augment its current offering. With
guidance from the CMO and consumer insights team, RCP initiated the second phase of the
consumer learning plan in China.
4.5.1 Sensing and searching—ethnographic study. RCP needed additional consumer
understanding to continue optimizing its marketing mix elements. In 2015, based on requests
from Davies and the marketing team, CMI commenced an ethnographic study to provide
contextual learnings around cleaning and refuse products in the two priority verticals (hospitality
and property management). Data were collected from 25 ch/users in hospitality and property
management, along with building service contractors who held the cleaning contracts for top
properties in China. The data provided insight into ch/user perceptions, buying behaviors, and
cleaning and refuse product usage. Interview respondents were employed at various levels
within their organizations, including as general managers, housekeeping managers, and cleaning
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staff employees.
The ethnographic study’s objective was to understand the “why” behind the quantitative
product concept results. Not only would it help explain why some concepts failed with ch/users,
it would also provide insight into why some product concepts were accepted. The consumer
insights team analyzed the quantitative data on the concepts, then used this data to prioritize
product attributes and correlate them with relevance scores in the concept tests. In some
instances, attributes rated differently than the marketing team expected (see Figure 11). For
example, the “lasts a long time” attribute did not correlate as highly with relevance as predicted,
yet “durability” was a key communication claim and pillar for the RCP brand in the US and had
therefore been adapted as a top claim in China as well. Indeed, as noted earlier, the brand was
positioned around performance and durability: “Only RCP outlasts and outpeforms anyone else.”
Another key attribute the team sought to understand was the unexpectedly low relevance of
“impact on my company’s image.” Based on the North American market, the team assumed that
using RCP products in a property positively impacted the property’s image with patrons, and that
the RCP brand gave people confidence regarding proper cleaning standards and a well-run
property. The team needed a deeper understanding of ch/users’ attitudes and habits concerning
cleaning and refuse products and how they might influence RCP’s future product strategy.
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Figure 11. Product attribute correlation to relevance metric. (#3)

4.5.2 Results of the ethnographic study. “Quantitative research, by definition, is
incapable of unearthing a ‘golden nugget,’ an epiphany that elucidates buying behavior.”
(Doctoroff, 2005). The ethnography study gave the China marketing team key insights not
previously identified in the concept product testing. The concept tests sought to validate the
proposition of existing North American products, which had not been adapted for the Chinese
market in any way. The results were useful, and they validated a majority of the product mix as
relevant for local ch/users. If many US product concepts had failed, NB may decided to exit the
market or put all investment and growth expectations on hold until an appropriate product mix
was established for the market. Yet, despite the fact that many products passed the action
standards, it was clear from the experiential learning and concept test results that North
American product could not be the only aspect of the marketing mix. The ethnographic test
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offered a context for how people were using cleaning and refuse tools. It also highlighted the
unmet needs of choosers to inform potential innovation and new product strategies. The
ethnography also unearthed some local user challenges that a product or new tool would be
unable to solve. It gave the RCP China team a view of RCP “categories in context.” As noted in
the study design brief (#5), the RCP China management team was looking for deeper qualitative
perspectives on two topics:


Cultural challenges—and how to overcome them—in relation to the process of
cleaning and handling of materials



Developing a true core competency around providing services to ch/users

Obtaining deeper insights about choosers, users, and influencers from a cultural perspective,
along with a better understanding of the “clean” concept in the Chinese market could help the
organization refine its marketing mix elements even further.
4.5.2.1 Overview of the ethnography approach. The NB consumer insights team
contracted an agency partner to facilitate several types of learning activities, both formal and
informal. First, researchers conducted face-to-face formal interviews with general managers,
housekeeping managers, and “ayis” (equivalent to maids/housekeepers in China). Second, they
went on facility tours to observe products in use and videotape ayis cleaning hotel rooms and
properties.
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Table 12. Overview of Ethnography Participants (#5)
Overview of Ethnography Fieldwork

Hospitality
Property Management

Expert Interviews

Locations Visited/Observed

Interviews Conducted

Two 5-star hotels, three 4-star
hotels, and one budget/local
chain
Four building service
contractors

Six general managers (GMs), five
housekeeping managers, and four ayis
(housekeepers)
Four GMs/VPs, four cleaning
managers, and three ayis
Interviewed experts at RCP and at
Diversey, a chemical provider with
customers similar to RCP

4.5.2.2. The cleaning landscape in China. Several characteristics unique to the Chinese
market emerged from the ethnographic study. The professional cleaning landscape was
experiencing accelerated growth rates due to continued property development across China, and
it posed challenges for Chinese choosers that were different than those of their North American
counterparts. Further, China’s retail, office space, and hotel properties were expanding at a rapid
pace, whereas North America was experiencing declines in retail and office space, and hotel
growth had remained relatively steady. China’s market growth created many constraints that RCP
had to consider. Poor infrastracture was highlighted as a key barrier to properties carrying a full
range of cleaning tools. Many properties in China—while luxurious on the outside—were
deficient in proper planning for back-of-house support. As a result, many properties lacked
storage space for tools and lacked hot water in key locations required for cleaning.
4.5.2.3 New vs. durable. The RCP team sought to understand how the local Chinese
consumer perceived the durability proposition. RCP managers were concerned about the recent
product concept tests’ correlation of durability to relevance, which was lower than the team
expected. In North America, durability had been a key selling point of the RCP brand, and it had
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influenced how products were developed and manufactured, as well as which materials were
used in manufacturing. This robustness built into the products drove the brand’s premium price
position and was a key differentiator from its competition. In interviews, however, property
managers emphasized why durable, long-lasting products might not be preferred: cleaning tools
were often visible to their patrons, so having tools that appeared new was more important than
durability. Properties such as malls and office buildings were cleaned during the day, when the
“day cleaning” ayis would continuously walk the properties and perform cleaning duties among
the patrons. Because of this, property managers highlighted the need for products that appeared
new; as one put it, “The cheapest new mop still looks better than an expensive old mop.” (#5)
Another manager said that he had no desire to order products that last a long time. “I would
rather spend money to buy something one-third cheaper than one that is more expensive and can
be used for 5–10 years; we will not consider that.”(#5) Given their high visibility, having newlooking tools was considered a high priority, so tools should be durable enough to not rapidly
appear worn down, but not be so durable that replacing them at regular intervals would be
wasteful.
This gave the RCP team much to consider in its product portfolio. A less durable product
range could be offered, but this was antithesis to the brand promise. One approach considered
was to redefine “durable” for the local market, developing products that were less durable than
those in the US, but still durable enough for the local market to outperform the competition.
Another consideration was to develop tools to teach local choosers about the higher return on
investment (ROI) they could achieve by purchasing long-lasting products versus replacing them
often. ROI was a key consideration for North American choosers, but did not seem to be a
consideration for Chinese choosers. Because many properties guarantee cleaning contracts only
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for short durations, ROI could be challenging; as one manager points out, “Most cleaning
contracts for BSC [building service contractors] are only one-year long, so long-term benefits in
tools are not appealing.” (#5) The prominence of one-year contracts proved challenging for
RCP. If a building service contractor was guaranteed a cleaning contract only for one year, they
had little incentive to buy tools that lasted beyond the contract duration. Clearly, there were
many implications to consider for a brand built on the idea that it “outperforms and outlasts”
anyone else.
4.5.2.4 A need for training and standards of clean. China’s accelerated property growth
was driving demand for professional cleaning services and labor was putting a huge strain on
property owners. Labor for cleaning professionals had become scarce. General managers were
experiencing high turnover rates and had difficulty staffing teams at full capacity. This resulted
in a constant need to train staff members on operating procedures and how to use cleaning tools.
Managers were also concerned about the caliber of talent in their organizations. Some managers
believed that ayis could not retain information; as one put it, “It’s important for me to repeat
important things at staff meetings, otherwise ayis always forget.”(#5)
A primary driver behind tool choices and operating procedures was the “rough” behavior
of cleaning staff. The ayis were often migrants from rural parts of the country and lacked
intuitive behaviors around care, discretion, and follow-through—the very factors that are often
the mark of quality hotel services and high-end properties. This aggressive behavior led some
managers to come up with alternative solutions, such as taking away hospitality carts because
staff members tend to run them into walls and doors or pile them too high with dirty linens and
other goods. Describing the reasoning for getting rid of the carts, one property owner lamented:
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“And those ayis, they are not highly paid. So, you can imagine when they cross the
corridor where there are some doors—they drive the cart like a tank, and they hit my
doors! Because they are working very hard, they do not care. So, this is to protect my
corridor. Secondly, in many new hotels, the corridor is not wide enough.” (#5)

Property owners and building service contractors experienced pressure to maintain
consistent standards in their properties, yet these standards had begun to continually increase in
order to provide a competitive advantage to guests. One property manager felt the standards put
in place by property owners were completely unattainable:

“The cleaning standard is 100%, yet we can never achieve 100%. Everyone understands
it, but it is not acheivable.” (#5)

Further, given the class stratification in China, most housekeeping managers lacked
practical cleaning experience. Discussions with choosers exposed this need for practical handson training and education to help these managers gain seasoned experience. One property
manager shared his frustration with the general caliber of talent, which dilutes operating
standards as they filter down through his organization:

“We have a saying that, when a company gives the standard to the VP, then to the project
manager, the project manager will understand only 90% of the content. By the time it
gets to the supervisor, only 80% is left, and by the time it gets to the ayis, only 60%
remains.” (#5)
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International chemical and machine suppliers were highly regarded by the various
stakeholders interviewed and could serve as a benchmark for RCP. Strong brand awareness and
loyalty for companies such as K’Archer and Diversey existed in part due to the quality of their
goods, but had more to do with the services they provide in parallel to their core offering. These
companies help with training, inspection, tracking, and internal organization. This helps
choosers improve the knowledge of their workforce, which is especially important when
choosers lack internal resources and training capabilities themselves. Such companies thus had
become trusted partners and pushed for exacting standards in an environment pressured to cut
corners. Educating workers and making solutions mistake-proof resonated with property
managers. A representative from K’Archer, a cleaning machine brand, discussed why they
prioritize training:

“Actually, in the process of cleaning, we train our cleaners to do cleaning service
elegantly. When you see [an ayi] holding a K’Archer vacuum cleaner, and working in a
very elegant way, it is actually quite beautiful. This is my feeling.” (#5)

RCP offered little training or services to end users during this time, and any training
offered was focused more on basic product usage than holistic cleaning operating procedures. In
North America, standard operating procedures were developed by the properties or BSCs, so
there was little need to teach cleaning professionals how to clean. In China, RCP had the
potential to establish itself as an expert in the cleaning tool market and fill a need in the
professional cleaning industry. Establishing cleaning protocols and training workers on these
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standards could be a competitive advantage for the brand. As with the cleaning machine, there
was an opportunity to design tools that encouraged proper usage and provide standards to
encourage graceful action on the part of the ayis. Many of the machine brands also provided
certifications when ayis completed trainings. A manager highlighted how this elevated the role
of the ayis; they are, he said, “highly valued because they give face to the profession.” (#5) That
is, because ayis are visible and interact with guests, they are the “face” of a cleaning service
company, so it is important that they project a positive image. “When the cleaners come in, their
first training is on detergent, the second is on use of training tools, and the third training is on
courtesy and manners.” (#5)
4.5.2.5 Opportunity for front of the house cleaning tools. Ch/users also identifed the
need for products to be secure. This was surprising to the RCP management team, as security
was not a significant problem in North America. In China, when ayis were cleaning in public
spaces, crowds sometimes became unruly and vandalized the cleaning carts. Also, when carts
were left unattended, patrons of the property would sometimes steal cleaning supplies to take
home or to wash their cars in the property parking lots:

“Ayis need to watch their cart in the basement, because people will take away cleaning
cloth and buckets if ayis are not mindful. Some customers will take away cleaning cloths
and buckets to clean their cars parked in the underground garage.” (#5)

Ayis need to stay near their carts and cleaning supplies to prevent theft and vandalism,
which can be very costly to property owners and BSCs. General security was also cited as an
issue, as patrons sometimes tamper with products and misuse them if they are left out in public.
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One ayi spoke about hiding tools from plain view, noting that the ayis put “some buckets onto a
cart in the back-of-house exit passageway, rather than having all carts use buckets because young
children sometimes urinate in the them.” (#5) Although security was not initially an issue that
the RCP team had considered as a product requirement, it was identified as a potential way to
drive differentiation versus the competition.
4.5.2.5.1 Front of house vs. back of house. Unlike in North America, the study found that
where products were actually used in China drove different purchase considerations for users. As
noted earlier, many malls and office properties offer day cleaning, so ayis are continually
cleaning and visible, which gives patrons confidence in a well-run property. High-end properties
opted for RCP cleaning carts as a “star” cleaning touch point. The RCP carts circulated among
the shoppers and office workers and provided strong impressions of the cleaning service. One
office manager noted that “a ‘branded’ cart is a key touch-point for guests to see how prestigious
the cleaning company is, and RCP carts have been very popular for this reason.” (#5) In these
high-end scenarios, the RCP brand was highly valued for its premium, international status, and
procurement managers often required the purchase of RCP brands: “Yellow is sparking.
Rubbermaid is famous in America. We have to choose RCP products for guest-facing
categories.” (#5)
Based on these learnings, RCP managers found that the current product offering in the
marketing mix aligned most closely to front-of-house standards and activities in properties, as
this is where choosers placed a premium on spending. Visible cleaning is the touchstone service
that showcases the value a management company brings to malls, offices, or other properties.
Cleaners are the frontline “faces” who interact with the guests, and their daytime cleaning
behaviors are on display for everyone to see. Thus, beyond its current product offering, RCP saw
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an opportunity to create tools with a product image and “signature” feel that enhanced the
branded visibility of cleaning and reinforced the premium, professional image of the cleaning
team’s work. In image-centric China, the image of the tool appeared to be more important than
the end cleaning result.
Hotel managers took a similar approach to tools visible to guests. If a hotel guest could
see, touch, or interact with a tool, it must be of the best quality and brand. If a cleaning process
was invisible to guests, branding and quality became much less important to choosers. In hotels,
for example, room cleaning was rarely visible to the guest. An international hotel property
chooser explained it this way:

“Because the process of most hotel cleaning is invisible to the guests, the end result is the
only thing that matters. Therefore, the hotel does not need to depict a ‘professional’
image with its tools.” (#5)

A local hotel manager was even more adamant that professional tools and standards were
unnecessary for room cleaning, stating that: “There are many reasons guests come to my hotel.
Hygiene is not one of them.” (#5)
This was a clear difference from North America, where few differences in buying
patterns exist for back-of-house versus front-of-house usage. Thus, it was essential to sales
growth that RCP create value among patrons for tools used in these “invisible” back-of-house
instances; that would only be possible, however, if patrons demanded that properties use quality
products in all cases. Another option was to better educate the hospitality industry about the
short-term savings available when RCP products are used in synergy with one another—
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meaning, that is, that it was not necessarily cost effective to have two sets of tools. A third
consideration was to train housekeeping managers so they could become key advocates for the
brand within their organizations. Table 14 summarizes the differences identified in the role of
cleaning between the property management (malls and office spaces) and hospitality verticals
that RCP served. These learnings gave the RCP marketing team several options to consider in
relation to its marketing mix.
Table 13. Comparison of Property Management & Hospitality Learnings
Comparison of Two Market Verticals - Overview

Property Management
Role of Cleaning

Meaning of Clean (Guest)

What Cleaning is About (Ayi)

How are Ayi perceived?

Hospitality

Room cleaning is the baseline of
services, elevation of hotel services
doesn't come from cleaning
Cleaning is part of the interior décor - it
Cleaning is the human-factor, the
is an "invisible" service delivering the
surrogate of service
end result of clean space
A location based responsibility and
A task based mentality, ayi is to carry a
repetitive in order to maintain standard series of tasks to ensure that the room is
in the space
"ready"
Frontline server of the Property
Management Company, Premium
cleaning = Premium Service
"Cinderella" - not guest facing staff
Cleaning helps Property manager to
justify the value of its services

Seeking innovative solutions on raising Key areas of interest are new solutions
industry standard on achieving cleaning to reduce labor headcount, elevate
Innovation needs in Cleaning
results
labor capability, improving productivity
Interest in premium tools to elevate the
appearance of cleaning standards

4.5.3 The global–local marketing mix. The ethnographic study’s sensing and searching
activity provided rich insights that the RCP China management had not previously unearthed. It
explained the cultural implications of cleaning in China and provided insights into why Chinese
ch/users had different needs than those in North America. Although portions of the current corefocused marketing mix were relevent, the Chinese market also needed local adaptations to meet
unique demands. As Table 14 shows, this knowledge acquired through sensing and searching
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caused the organization to yet again reshape some of its marketing mix elements. However two
elements of the 4Ps had stabilized: the RCP team did not change pricing or placement strategies
in this phase, as the study did not indicate any red flags or needed changes in either area.
The RCP team initiated new promotional activity to address some of the challenges
highlighted in the ethnogrpahic study. First, it developed ROI calculators for choosers. These
calculators were designed to compare the actual costs of buying a competitive product, along
with the subsequent replacement costs, compared to purchasing an RCP product with longlasting properties and warranties. They also calculated cost-in-use, so owners could compare
usage rates among brands. RCP continued to believe product durability was a necessary tenant of
the brand, and chose not to use cheaper materials, less costly manufacturing processes, or
otherwise change its product make-up. The ROI calculator was a way to teach choosers the longterm value of owning RCP products.
Another addition to the promotional element was developing a partnership with the
global Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA). RCP had strong relationships with
BOMA in North America, but had not yet formed this partnership with the local chapter in
China. BOMA and RCP discussed a joint initiative to develop a SOP manual for cleaning in
China to define the “gold standard” of cleaning. This gave RCP the opportunity to be one of the
initial authors of cleaning standards in China. With this initiative, RCP had the chance to speak
at local conferences and on panels with building property owners and managers. It also looked to
develop a certification program, including trainings and a set of test instruments for
housekeeping managers and ayis. This certification program would not only ensure that
employees were properly trained on cleaning standards, but it would also give them the
recognition they desired (as identified in the ethnography study).
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Finally, RCP looked to develop local product for the Chinese market. The ethnographic
study gave the marketing team several ideas about how to solve users’ needs in both the
hospitality and property management verticals. It planned to use these insights to build benefitdriven products specifically relevant to the unique challenges users faced. These product
concepts would be tested early in the development process to ensure that they uniquely met
consumer needs, and the team would continue to validate the products with ch/users along the
way. RCP planned to launch these new innovations in 2017 alongside its current product
offering.
Table 14 offers a summary of the new Global–Local marketing mix.
Table 14. Marketing Mix—Global/Local
Marketing Mix Strategy
2017 and Beyond
Global/Local
Product
Continue with 528 SKUS
Available and focus on core US
products that tested well with
choosers & users

Pricing
Continue with current pricing
strategy of 0-20% premium to
market leader (20% for
innovation/differentiation)

Promotion
Place
Continue with Core advertising Continue focus on 48 distributors
campaign, showrooms and
with majority of sales in 5 major
previous PR and trial campaigns. cities

Create a specific line of tools for
PM and Hospitality Verticals
based on learnings

Develop partnership with
Added Building Service
BOMA, a regarded association Contractors as a direct sales
for Building Owners and property focuses versus accessing through
managers to develop an industry distributors
cleaning standard and guide that
would elevate RCP as the "gold
standard" in cleaning

Create a SERVICE to provide
training and continual monitoring
post-purchase

Develop ROI calculators for
choosers to teach the long term
and cost-in-use savings potential
through purchasing durable, longlasting products

4.5.4 Performance monitoring—the results. RCP is now in the midst of executing its
newly informed marketing strategy. This study concluded in 2016, however, so results are not
available on the organization’s performance in 2017 and beyond.
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5.0 Discussion and Contributions
This research highlights several themes that run throughout RCP’s market entry strategy
in China. First, RCP’s marketing mix is emergent. It has both realized and unrealized aspects
based on the TMT’s original intentions and stated strategy. Throughout the marketing strategy
development process, learning occurs and, as knowledge is acquired, marketing mix elements are
revised or sometimes changed all together. Second, this knowledge acquisition occurs
throughout each phase of the emerging strategy, and in some cases, multiple learning behaviors
were evident in a single temporal phase. Four of the five knowledge acquisition behaviors were
displayed throughout the research period. The fifth—vicarious learning—was not evident in this
context, possibly because the RCP organization had considerable experience in the US market
and, given its home market leadership, might not have seen the benefit in monitoring or
benchmarking the competition. It is also possible that vicarious learning took place, but was not
formally documented or discussed in organization strategy sessions. Third, knowledge
acquisition is the impetus for reshaping the strategy. In some instances, specific types of
knowledge acquisition accelerated this process. Finally, as the strategy emerged, the
organization’s results improved. This is not to say, however, that the strategy should be deemed
successful per se. Performance monitoring on the market mix’s next phase has yet to take place,
and the organization’s results should be measured over time as RCP continues to establish itself
in the Chinese market.
Based on the study’s longitudinal nature, the strategy building process can be examined
over time versus solely at its inception. NB is dedicated to RCP’s success in China, and—as an
organization focused on learning—it works to shape and reframe the strategy based on new
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experiences and the knowledge that results. Given this context, the organization did not cling to
its initial strategy (i.e., Export Model), nor did it deem it a failure to revise that strategy. Rather,
the performance monitoring of sales revenue and continued acquisition of knowledge about the
local market gave NB the inputs it needed to guide strategy revisions, allowing new strategy to
emerge. As in Mintzberg’s analogy of a potter (1988), RCP formed a marketing strategy for
China and, through knowledge acquisition, molded each element of its marketing mix over time.
Four knowledge acquisition behaviors were evident in this study. RCP’s learnings were
both planned and unplanned and both were beneficial to shaping the marketing mix. The initial
marketing strategy was founded on congenital learning, as RCP used its experience in North
America to make decisions about its approach to entering China. Unplanned learning, including
the new management team’s experiential learning upon entering the Chinese market, gave that
team a better understanding of what Chinese distributors needed to be successful and offered
insight into how RCP was viewed compared to the competition. The organization’s planned
learnings included grafting, by adding new leadership with substantial experience launching into
new markets, and sensing and searching, which directed the formal studies. Both approaches
gave RCP deep insights into the consumers, their perceptions, and how they might use different
RCP products. Indeed, these planned learning initiatives appear to have accelerated the shaping
and reframing of the strategy itself.
The organization reshaped its marketing strategy as it acquired knowledge. The TMT
continued to redefine marketing mix elements to better align with the OL. Internally, these
changes were not defined as strategy failures or strategies unrealized, but rather as indicative of
the continuous learning and inputs needed when entering a foreign market. The Chinese market
is complex, and RCP’s continued knowledge acquisition highlighted the need for organizational
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changes. The initial marketing mix was not one that could drive continual growth over the long
term. These marketing strategy shifts show the organization’s commitment to success in the
Chinese market and its ability to learn and apply the learnings within the strategy context. In
addition, these learnings can also be applied to other NB divisions considering a launch into
China or other emerging markets, and can both inform and accelerate their approach to strategy
development.
As the strategy emerged, RCPs revenue growth markedly improved. Throughout each
phase of the strategy process, knowledge acquisition gave the management team insights about
how to continue unlocking growth opportunities in the Chinese market. Conversely, in the
strategy’s initial stage, when the marketing mix had yet to change and new learnings were not
applied, revenues were stagnant. Therefore, knowledge acquisition and its infusion into strategy
was a key element to reinvigorating RCP’s market growth.
5.1. Limitations
This study has three identified limitations. First, because the researcher is an employee
of NB and the RCP marketing team’s former leader, biases can clearly come into play. Second,
because this is a single case study, the results are not generalizable. They can, however, provide a
framework for future statistical analysis. Finally, the data analyzed is archival and secondary, so
additional research was not possible when information gaps arose.
5.2. Contributions and Implications for Future Research
Using the concepts of emergent strategy and the OL sub-concept of knowledge
acquisition as a theoretical framework, this study examines how NB, and RCP specifically,
optimized and surfaced its marketing strategy in China over time.
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This study not only shows how the market mix elements emerged and evolved, but also
describes the results that followed. The study further shows how different knowledge acquisition
aspects and behaviors informed decisions throughout each phase of the marketing strategy. As
the following sections describe, the research advances knowledge in both theory and practice.
5.2.1 Contribution to theory. The study’s longitudinal nature shows that the marketing
strategy was not formulated and then unrealized, but rather its elements emerged over time and
were optimized based on the firm’s behaviors. The study brought forth the idea that
organizational knowledge acquisition was the impetus to this emergent strategy process and
drove change within the strategy’s temporal stages. Four of the five knowledge acquisition types
were evident, and grafting played a significant role in the firm’s learning. NB’s new leadership
grafted new processes and approaches to the marketing mix, which optimized and accelerated
performance compared to the previous learning types. Previous work has explored experiential
and congenital learning in detail, but little work has been done to identify the importance of
grafting and its impact on a strategy’s trajectory and its realization in subsequent performance.
This is an area that future research can explore in other strategy contexts. There is also an
opportunity for other OL aspects to be combined with emergent strategy to determine how OL
interplays with the emergent strategy concept.
In this context, knowledge acquisition occurred over time, so elements of the marketing
strategy began to stabilize. In the initial stages, the elements changed significantly. As time
passed and knowledge was continually acquired, however, certain elements were minimally
refined or remained unchanged. It appears that, the deeper and more deliberate the learning, the
more refined and optmized the strategy becomes. Figure 12 shows each of the 4Ps and how they
emerged or were realized during RCP’s Chinese market entry phases. As the graphs show, each
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element achieved varying rates of realization and some elements continue to emerge. This is a
concept to be further studied; Figure 13 shows a potential framework for that future exploration.

Figure 12. RCP’s marketing mix elements and their emergence over time.
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Figure 13. A framework to test combining knowledge acquisition and strategy.
5.2.2 Contribution to practice. Grafting is an area for practitioners to consider in the
strategy development context. In this study, grafting had a positive impact on OL and appeared
to accelerate strategy development. This requires further research and analysis, but could have
implications for organizations and their hiring strategies. A deeper understanding of grafting
could help organizations determine when it is best to graft new talent into an organization by
hiring from outside rather than hiring and/or promoting from within.
Another key area of interest emerging from this study are the concepts of “front of house”
and “back of house” product offerings in China. Based on the cultural context of “face,” it could
be interesting for marketers to explore how these usages influence consumer buying behaviors in
other product categories. This could have implications for product development approaches,
depending not only on where the product is used, but also on where others observe its use.
Examining one firm’s market entry strategy in China revealed the knowledge acquisition
behaviors influencing its marketing mix and decision making. This provides a framework for
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firms considering new markets and how to approach and develop a learning plan prior to entry.
By implementing these concepts prior to launch, other firms might improve their performance
and more effectively guide their learning. The study also shows the time, resources, and patience
required when entering new markets. It further provides context on the danger of immediately
dismissing a strategy or deeming it a failure; knowledge acquisition can help shape that strategy
over time.
In conclusion, David Knights and Frank Mueller said it best:
“If strategy is in a continuous process of becoming, analytic attention is
directed towards those practices that are associated with its construction in
inertial, stabilizing or changing paths of becoming. Most importantly, in
studying the becoming of activity, we acknowldege that a strategist’s work is
never ‘done,’ strategy is always an unfinished project under construction”
(2004).
Likewise, there is more to learn in relation to strategy itself, and how knowledge acquisition
plays into its formation. The researcher looks forward to continued advancement in this realm.
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7.0 APPENDICES

Name of Internal
Document

Region/
Year

Document Type

Type of
Respondents

RCP Brand Pyramid

North
America
2012

Internal Marketing
Document

N/A

RCP China Strategy

China
2013

Internal Marketing
Document

RCP Concept Test Memo

China
2013

Internal Marketing
Document

Type of Data

Sample
Size

Ref
#

N/A

N/A

1

N/A

N/A

N/A

2

N/A

N/A

N/A

Qualitative:
-interviews
China RCP Route-to-e to
Market Study Project

China
201

Refuse
Cleaning

Users &
Choosers

Quantitative:
65 question
survey
Observation
Qualitative:
-interviews

Decoding Professional
Clean Ethnographic Study

Product Concept Test 1

Product Concept Test 2

China
2015

China
2013

China
2013

Refuse
Cleaning

Refuse
Cleaning

Refuse
Cleaning

Users &
Choosers

Users &
Choosers

Users &
Choosers

Quantitative:
65 question
survey
Observation
Quantitative: 65
question survey
(Ordinal)
Qualitative:
optional writeins/verbatim
Quantitative: 65
question survey
(Ordinal)
Qualitative:
optional writeins/verbatim

3

Total N
= 25
N(I) =
25
N(O) =7

Total N
N= 25
N N(I)
= 25
N N(O)
=7
N(C) =
150
N(PM)
= 75
N(Hosp
) = 75
N(B) =
150
N(PM)
= 75
N(HOS
P) = 75
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5

6

7
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